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TRADE SECRET FAIR USE 
Deepa Varadarajan* 
 
Trade secret law arose to help companies protect confidential 
information (e.g., the Coca-Cola formula) from competitors seeking to copy 
their innovative efforts.  But companies increasingly use trade secret law to 
block a wide swath of information from the scrutinizing eyes of consumers, 
public watchdog groups, and potential improvers.  Companies can do this, 
in part, because trade secret law lacks clear limiting doctrines that 
consider the social benefits of unauthorized use.  For example, trade secret 
law makes no allowance for the departing employee that uses proprietary 
information to create a substantially improved product or disclose public 
health risks. 
This Article argues that trade secret law’s indifference to the social 
benefits of unauthorized use stands in contrast to other intellectual property 
doctrines, like patent and copyright.  Copyright law incorporates the 
affirmative defense of “fair use,” which aims to protect a variety of 
unauthorized but socially beneficial uses of another’s copyrighted work 
(e.g., educational uses).  To a lesser extent, patent law’s reverse doctrine of 
equivalents and remedies analysis direct courts to consider the social 
benefits of a defendant’s technological improvement.  Such limiting 
doctrines act as safety valves to reconcile intellectual property rights with 
competing cumulative innovation and First Amendment interests.  This 
Article demonstrates the merits of a similar safety valve in trade secret law 
and argues that courts should adopt a multi-factor “trade secret fair use” 
analysis to better address these competing concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Not all unauthorized users of property are considered villains by the law.  
Take, for example, the trespasser who invades an owner’s parcel of land to 
take shelter from a natural disaster or the mistaken improver who takes 
lumber from another’s land to make far more valuable wooden hoops.  
Property law sanctions such unauthorized uses, either by excusing the 
user’s liability or removing injunctive relief as a remedy.1 
Moving from the realm of tangible property to intellectual property, the 
law is similarly forgiving of the teacher who makes limited but 
unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work for classroom use; or the 
parodist who incorporates lyrics from a copyrighted song into a new song 
for humorous effect; or the follow-on inventor who makes significant 
improvements to a patented train brake that nonetheless infringes the 
original owner’s patent.2  In these latter examples, the violation of 
copyright or patent laws carries certain social benefits that are recognized 
and encouraged through various limiting doctrines.  Notably, copyright law 
and, to a lesser extent, patent law incorporate ex post limiting doctrines that 
try to balance owners’ rights to exclude against competing concerns, like 
promoting cumulative innovation (i.e., new works that build on existing 
works) and First Amendment interests.3 
Trade secret law is a different kind of animal.  Like patent and copyright, 
trade secret law protects intangible, informational goods.  Specifically, trade 
secret law protects certain confidential information that companies attempt 
to keep secret, including both “technical” information (e.g., mechanical 
processes and chemical formulas) and “business” information (e.g., 
customer lists, marketing plans, and pricing data).  The subject matter of 
trade secret overlaps with patent and copyright but can sweep even more 
broadly.  For “virtually any useful information” can be a trade secret, so 
long as the information is relatively secret, economically valuable, and 
subjected to reasonable secrecy precautions by the owner.4  Trade secret 
 
 1. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 320 (1871) (applying the doctrine of 
accession to hold that Wetherbee could keep the hoops made from lumber taken in good 
faith, provided he compensated Green for the value of lumber); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 
189 (Vt. 1908) (holding that “necessity . . . will justify entries upon land and interferences 
with personal property that would otherwise have been trespasses”). 
 2. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 3. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 4. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01, at 1-6 (2014). 
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law’s reach has become even more expansive in recent decades, creeping 
further into places that patent and copyright cannot.5 
To be liable for trade secret misappropriation, however, one must 
“misappropriate” the protected information.  That is, the acquisition, use, or 
disclosure of the information must involve “improper means” or breach of a 
confidentiality duty.6  This requirement makes trade secret law unique and 
reflects how its origins differ from those of patent and copyright laws.  
Despite such differences, however, courts and scholars increasingly view 
trade secret law as a subset of intellectual property, because like patent and 
copyright laws, trade secret law can also serve as a mechanism to encourage 
invention and creation.7 
And like transgressors in patent and copyright, those who violate trade 
secret law sometimes serve socially beneficial ends.  For example, consider 
an employee who publicly discloses without permission the secret formula 
for a coal processing chemical or a hydraulic “fracking” chemical that can 
leak into the water supply and significantly affect public health.  Or 
consider a health care consulting company that aggregates and discloses 
prices paid by hospitals for medical devices, information that is deemed 
proprietary by the device manufacturer but has implications for national 
health care costs.8  Or consider a departing employee who makes significant 
improvements to trade secret–protected information gleaned from her 
previous workplace, resulting in a train brake with vastly superior stopping 
power.9  All of these potential violations of trade secret law carry societal 
benefits that ought to be encouraged, or at least, not discouraged.  But trade 
secret law is largely indifferent to the benefits of unauthorized use. 
Unlike copyright and patent laws, trade secret law lacks limiting 
doctrines sufficiently attuned to a defendant’s follow-on improvements10 or 
to First Amendment interests, like creating a well-informed citizenry and 
fostering open debate over matters of public interest.  While trade secret 
law excuses “reverse engineers” (i.e., those who take something apart to see 
how it works) from liability,11 in a number of contexts this defense falls 
 
 5. See, e.g., David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability:  Trade Secrets in Our 
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 151–55 (2007); see also Annemarie Bridy, Trade 
Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices:  How Medical Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to 
Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 188 (2009); infra Part 
I.A. 
 6. See infra Part II.C. 
 7. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 8. See infra Part III.B. 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
 10. In previous work, I have argued that even limiting doctrines in patent and copyright 
law should focus more directly on the fact and significance of a second-comer’s 
unauthorized “improvement.”  Drawing comparisons to “improvement doctrines” in tangible 
property law, I suggest reforms to patent and copyright law that would make consideration 
of a defendant’s improvement more explicit and routine at the liability and remedies stages. 
See generally Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657 
(2014). 
 11. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437, 438 (1990); 
see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1582 (2002). 
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short.  By contrast, copyright law’s fair use doctrine protects a variety of 
unauthorized but socially beneficial uses.12  Other parts of the copyright 
statute provide certain safe harbors, such as exempting libraries from 
liability for reproducing copyrighted works.13  Patent law is generally less 
forgiving of unauthorized use than copyright.  But patent limiting doctrines 
like the reverse doctrine of equivalents, as well as recent changes to the 
patent remedies analysis after the U.S. Supreme Court’s eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.14 decision, direct courts to consider the social 
benefits of a defendant’s unauthorized use in certain contexts.15 
Trade secret law’s relative indifference both to cumulative innovation 
concerns and First Amendment concerns contradicts intellectual property 
law’s underlying quest for balance.  That is, it ignores the role that 
intellectual property’s limiting doctrines play in adjusting the scope of 
exclusive rights to prevent both the overprotection and under-protection of 
information.16 
This discrepancy is particularly problematic because trade secrets have 
become a significant portion of American companies’ market value.17  
Certainly, trade secret law can help companies keep confidential 
information out of the “wrong” hands—e.g., competitors that want to free 
ride on owners’ efforts and provide directly competing products or 
processes, thus depressing originators’ incentives to innovate.  But 
companies increasingly use trade secret law to shield information from 
potential “right” hands—e.g., the scrutinizing eyes of government 
regulators, consumers, public watchdog groups, and significant 
improvers.18 
Part of the reason trade secret protection is attractive to companies is its 
ex ante flexibility (especially relative to patent law), coupled with its lack of 
ex post limiting doctrines.  That is, unlike patent, trade secret law has 
expansive subject matter breadth, minimal substantive requirements, and no 
formal application process before acquisition.  In this way, it is similar to 
copyright law, which also has few requirements on the front end.19  But 
copyright law partners ex ante flexibility with robust limiting doctrines like 
fair use that arose both to address First Amendment concerns and overcome 
the market failures that would otherwise prevent socially beneficial uses of 
 
 12. Limitations on Exclusive Rights:  Fair Use, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see infra Part 
II.B.1. 
 13. 17 U.S.C. § 110. 
 14. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (2002). 
 17. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 34, 35 (6th ed. 2012) (noting the particular importance of trade secrets 
to small companies); Adam Cohen, Securing Trade Secrets in the Information Age:  
Upgrading the Economic Espionage Act After United States v. Aleynikov, 30 YALE J. ON 
REG. 189, 192 (2013) (noting that “as much as seventy percent of American firms’ market 
value may lie in intellectual property, a significant part of which is trade secrets”). 
 18. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 5; see also infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part I.A. 
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the work from taking place.20  I analyze this problematic doctrinal gap in 
trade secret law and sketch a mechanism to fill it:  a doctrine of trade secret 
fair use. 
In Part I, I compare the basic contours and theoretical underpinnings of 
trade secret law to patent and copyright.  Despite the divergent normative 
accounts of trade secret law, judicial opinions and legal scholarship 
increasingly theorize it as a subset of intellectual property because it shares 
the utilitarian, incentive-promoting goals of patent and copyright.  This part 
also explores the pivotal role that scope-limiting doctrines play in 
intellectual property—i.e., to help balance the social costs of exclusive 
rights against their incentive-promoting benefits.  After setting the stage in 
Part I, Part II examines various scope-limiting doctrines in patent and 
copyright law that encourage unauthorized but socially beneficial uses of 
the protected information.  These limits—particularly, copyright’s fair use 
doctrine—stand in contrast to trade secret law. 
In Part III, I provide a typology of trade secret cases where this paucity of 
meaningful limits is particularly problematic:  cases involving significant 
follow-on “improvement” and cases involving the unauthorized disclosure 
of information pertinent to public health, safety, and welfare.  While trade 
secret law is fairly undertheorized in legal scholarship, a handful of scholars 
have described how trade secret law impedes public access to specific types 
of information—for example, information relevant to environmental harms, 
voting machine errors, search engine algorithms, and medical pricing 
data.21  Part III builds upon these prior accounts but situates them in the 
broader context of trade secret “fair uses.”  Moreover, no previous work (to 
my knowledge) has comprehensively addressed the failure of trade secret 
law to sufficiently address cumulative innovation concerns—a topic that 
has received much broader attention in the patent and copyright contexts. 
Finally, Part IV sketches the contours of a multifactor “fair use” doctrine 
for trade secret law and compares the benefits and drawbacks of this 
mechanism to other potential policy reforms, like statutory safe harbors that 
create specific exemptions or per se fair uses. 
I.   EX ANTE FLEXIBILITY AND EX POST LIMITATION:  
COMPARING TRADE SECRET TO COPYRIGHT AND PATENT 
“Intellectual property” law is an umbrella term used to describe discrete 
legal doctrines—patent, copyright, trademark, and increasingly, trade secret 
law—that govern the use of different kinds of information and insignia.  
 
 20. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 609. 
 21. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 5; Levine, supra note 5; David S. Levine, What Can the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act Learn from the Bayh-Dole Act?, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 615 (2000); 
Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy:  Reordering 
Information Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465 
(2007); Frank Pasquale, The Troubling Consequences of Trade Secret Protection of Search 
Engine Rankings, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY:  A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 381 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 
2011) [hereinafter TRADE SECRECY]. 
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Patent law protects certain categories of inventions that are useful, new, and 
nonobvious in light of the previous knowledge (or “prior art”) and satisfy 
various disclosure requirements.  Copyright law protects original works of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, including books, 
paintings, photographs, songs, computer software, and movies.  Trademark 
law protects words and symbols that help to identify the source of the goods 
or services (e.g., “Coca-Cola”).  Trade secret law protects certain 
confidential information that companies attempt to keep secret, including 
both “technical” information (e.g., processes and formulas, like the formula 
for Coca-Cola) and non-technological “business” information (e.g., 
customer lists).22 
Though all are grouped under the banner of “intellectual property,” these 
doctrines differ from each another in significant ways.  These differences 
are explained, at least in part, by the different subject matter they cover 
(e.g., inventions versus creative works), as well as their different origins.  
Patent and copyright laws have played an important role in American law 
since the country’s birth.  Both have a constitutional basis, and Congress 
enacted patent and copyright legislation by the late eighteenth century.23  In 
contrast, trade secret law was largely a nineteenth-century creation of 
Anglo-American courts, evolving out of related common law torts (e.g., 
unfair competition) and legal rules governing the employment 
relationship.24 
Unlike patent, copyright, and trademark, which are protected primarily 
by federal statute, trade secret is largely a creature of state law.  Currently, 
every state protects trade secrets.25  The 1939 Restatement (First) of Torts 
described the basic principles of trade secret in the early twentieth century, 
which most states then adopted.26  In 1979, a model state statute, the 
 
 22. See generally William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); 
MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 25–31. 
 23. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”); Copyright 
Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012)); Patent Act 
of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012)). 
 24. American courts did not recognize a cause of action for damages for trade secret 
misappropriation until 1837.  Injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation was 
recognized even later. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 35.  As early as the Renaissance, 
however, most European nation-states protected the secret processes and ideas of guild 
cartels and other businesses from third-party usurpation. Id. at 34.  Trademarks were 
protected in the eighteenth century “only by the common law of fraud,” and Congress did 
not enact the first federal trademark statute until 1870. Id. at 764. 
 25. Id. at 35. 
 26. See id. at 35.  The Restatement (First) of Torts protected secret information “used in 
one’s business” that gave its owner “an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).  
Interestingly, the 1979 Restatement (Second) of Torts omitted trade secret law “on the 
grounds that [it] had developed into an independent body of law that no longer relied on 
general principles of tort law.” MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 35–36.  But the original 
Restatement continues to influence trade secret law, as a number of state courts had relied 
upon it prior to the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA). Id. at 36. 
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Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) was promulgated.27  The UTSA has 
since been enacted (in some form) by forty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia.28  More recently, the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition described trade secret doctrine.29 
In the sections that follow, I compare the basic contours and theoretical 
underpinnings of trade secret law to those of patent and copyright.  Despite 
trade secret law’s unique origin story, it is increasingly theorized as a subset 
of intellectual property because it shares the incentive-promoting goals of 
patent and copyright.  Courts and scholars often justify patent, copyright, 
and trade secret laws as mechanisms to encourage the invention or creation 
of new technological advances and expressive works.30 
A.   Threshold Requirements for Protection 
Trade secret and copyright laws impose few requirements on the front 
end.  No formal application process is required, and the substantive 
requirements for obtaining protection are fairly minimal.  By contrast, 
patent law imposes a number of ex ante requirements.  Inventors seeking 
patent protection must submit a formal application to the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) that satisfies several substantive requirements of 
patentability.  I briefly discuss the threshold requirements for obtaining 
protection under each of these categories. 
1.   Trade Secret 
For trade secret protection, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
information at issue (1) falls within the subject matter of trade secret law 
and (2) was subjected to reasonable secrecy precautions.  The subject matter 
requirement of trade secret law is very broad (almost comically so); it 
includes “virtually any useful information,” so long as it has potential 
 
 27. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
 28. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
Act.aspx?title=Trade+Secrets+Act (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).  Massachusetts, New York, 
and North Carolina have not adopted the UTSA. Id.; see also Christopher B. Seaman, The 
Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript 
at 33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397567 (noting that 
“the UTSA’s widespread adoption has helped harmonize the substantive law governing trade 
secrecy”).  For a summary of state modifications to the UTSA, see generally 1 ROGER M. 
MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[3] (2014). 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (1995).  The 
Restatement (Third)’s definition of a trade secret, standard for misappropriation, and 
remedial provisions are similar to the UTSA:  it defines a trade secret broadly, encompassing 
“any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that 
is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over 
others.” Id. § 39; see also id. § 39 cmt. b (“The concept of a trade secret . . . is intended to be 
consistent with the definition of ‘trade secret’ in § 1(4) of the [UTSA].”).  Despite its 
relatively recent promulgation, the Restatement (Third) has had little impact on the 
development of trade secret law; “[m]ost states have adopted the UTSA as statutory law, and 
thus the Restatement (Third) is frequently disregarded.” Seaman, supra note 28, at 14. 
 30. Because trademark law is designed to do something quite different (i.e., to protect 
distinctive marks used in commerce for the purpose of lowering consumer search costs), I do 
not discuss it here. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 21–22. 
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economic value and is not generally known or readily ascertainable.31  
Information is capable of adding economic value if, for example, it “makes 
a product easier or cheaper to make, if it makes the product more attractive 
to customers, or if it helps the producer target likely customers.”32  The “not 
generally known” requirement means to exclude from trade secret 
protection commonly known information within an industry.33  One 
frequently cited difference between the definitions of a trade secret in the 
UTSA and Restatement (First) of Torts is that the UTSA does not require 
continuous use of the information.34 
Gauging whether the owner took “reasonable” precautions to guard the 
secrecy of the information is a fairly context-dependent inquiry.  But 
examples of reasonable secrecy measures include imposing confidentiality 
agreements, restricting physical access, and incorporating password 
protections.35  Notably, trade secret law does not require absolute secrecy 
for protection; relative secrecy is sufficient.  Thus, a trade secret owner can 
share secret information with employees and outsiders to exploit the 
secret’s commercial value, so long as the firm exercises some reasonable 
diligence to prevent unauthorized disclosure or use of the secret.36 
2.   Trade Secret vs. Patent 
To appreciate trade secret law’s subject matter breadth and ease of 
acquisition, one need only compare it to patent law.  To acquire a patent, an 
inventor must submit an application to the PTO that demonstrates her 
invention is patentable subject matter, useful, novel (i.e., different from the 
prior art), nonobvious (i.e., more than a trivial step beyond the prior art), 
and sufficiently described and enabled in the application so that others 
skilled in the relevant art can understand, make, and use it.37  A PTO 
examiner then checks that each requirement is met and negotiates with the 
inventor over the proper wording and scope of the patent claims.  “Claims” 
 
 31. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01. 
 32. Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade Secrecy, 41 J. 
TORT L. 1, 4 (2011); see, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1201 
(5th Cir. 1986).  Under the UTSA definition, the information is not required to have actual 
economic value to qualify for trade secret protection; even potential economic value is 
sufficient. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). 
 33. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 37. 
 34. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 5, 14 U.L.A. 439 (“The definition of ‘trade 
secret’ contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition 
which required that a trade secret be ‘continuously used in one’s business.’  The broader 
definition in the proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an 
opportunity or acquired means to put a trade secret to use.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus. Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.).  Courts and scholars have offered various justifications for the 
reasonable secrecy precautions requirement.  Some view it as evidence of the trade secret’s 
economic value (i.e., why bother guarding worthless information).  Others view it as 
evidence of the defendant’s wrongful acquisition. See, e.g., id. at 178–80 (discussing the 
various purposes of a reasonable secrecy requirement). 
 36. See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc., 790 F.2d at 1200 (concluding that “a holder may 
divulge his information to a limited extent without destroying its status as a trade secret”). 
 37. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012). 
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are numbered sentences that distinctly set out the boundaries of the 
invention—the “metes and bounds” of the inventor’s right to exclude if the 
patent issues.38  The written description and enablement requirements are 
part of the quid pro quo for the grant of the patent; in exchange for the right 
to exclude, the inventor’s disclosures add to the storehouse of public 
knowledge.39 
Trade secret law imposes none of these substantive requirements.  The 
absence of an absolute novelty requirement means that even if the trade 
secret owner was not the first to conceive of the confidential information, 
protection may nonetheless attach so long as the information is not 
generally known or readily ascertainable within the industry.40  The absence 
of a nonobviousness requirement means even slight variations to known 
processes can qualify for trade secret protection.41  The absence of a utility 
requirement means that even discoveries of what does not work—so-called 
negative know-how—can qualify for trade secret protection.42  The absence 
of patent law’s more circumscribed subject matter requirement means that 
trade secret information need not be technological in nature; even business 
information like customer lists, financial projections, pricing data, and 
marketing plans can qualify for trade secret protections.43 
Interestingly, early trade secrecy cases in the United States involved 
more limited subject matter—e.g., secret manufacturing processes that 
businesses tried to shield from competitors.  For example, an early seminal 
trade secret case, Peabody v. Norfolk,44 involved a secret industrial process 
for making gunny cloth.  In modern times, however, companies invoke 
trade secrecy law to guard a seemingly endless array of information not just 
from competitors but also from consumers and regulators.45  The expansive 
 
 38. Id. § 112. 
 39. Some commentators, however, have questioned the usefulness of patent disclosures 
to future innovators. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 
560 (2009). 
 40. See Claeys, supra note 32, at 4–5; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) 
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). 
 41. See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc., 790 F.2d at 1202 (observing that the trade secret 
may even include secret combinations of publicly known items); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. 
Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1256 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that a trade secret “may be no more 
than ‘merely a mechanical improvement that a good mechanic can make’” (quoting 
Schmidinger v. Welsh, 383 F.2d 455, 466 n.14 (3d Cir. 1967))). 
 42. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 439 (“The definition [of a trade 
secret] includes information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for 
example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process 
will not work could be of great value to a competitor.”); see also Charles Tait Graves, The 
Law of Negative Knowledge:  A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 389 (2007) 
(arguing that trade secret claims based on negative knowledge should be treated skeptically 
and rejected whenever possible). 
 43. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01, at 1-1, 1-5 to -6.  The subject matter of patent law is 
limited to any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 44. 98 Mass. 452 (1868). 
 45. See infra Part III.B. 
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reach of modern trade secret law has led a number of commentators to 
bemoan its subject matter breadth.46 
3.   Trade Secret vs. Copyright 
Copyright is closer to the trade secret end of the spectrum than patent, in 
terms of ex ante requirements.  Copyright law does not impose a formal 
application process.  Works are protected as soon as they are created.  
Historically, copyright law required notice and registration, but it does no 
longer.47  For work to be copyrightable, it must satisfy a low threshold of 
originality (i.e., be independently created and exhibit a “modicum of 
creativity”) and be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.48 
Thus, like trade secret and unlike patent, “copyright is rather 
indiscriminate, awarded by operation of law to authors whose works meet 
the minimal statutory requirements and regardless of whether the public 
will benefit from disclosure and dissemination of the copyrighted work.”49  
Usually, the trickier issue is determining the scope of copyright 
protection—a question that is usually answered in the context of 
infringement litigation, by comparing the copyrighted work to the allegedly 
infringing work.50 
4.   Relative “Strength” and Duration of the Right to Exclude 
Given these differences in threshold requirements, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that patent rights are “stronger” in nature.  A patent is harder 
to obtain, but once granted, the owner can exclude others from making, 
using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention.  This 
right to exclude extends even to those who independently create the 
invention.51 
In contrast, a copyright excludes only “copiers,” not independent creators 
of a work.  Copyright owners have exclusive rights to reproduce the work, 
to prepare derivative works based on the original, and to distribute, 
perform, and display the work to the public.52  Similarly, trade secret law 
does not constrain independent creators.  Under trade secret law, the owner 
can only exclude “misappropriators”—i.e., those who acquire, use, or 
 
 46. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 47. This lessening of formalities has made it more difficult for potential users to locate 
rights-holders. See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About 
Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1327–28 (2008).  Registration of a copyrighted 
work is, however, a prerequisite to filing an infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). 
 48. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 
(1991). 
 49. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1185. 
 50. See infra Part II.B. 
 51. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); see also Clarissa Long, Information Costs in Patent and 
Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 525–33 (2004). 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
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disclose the information in breach of a confidentiality duty (e.g., a departing 
employee) or through “improper means.”53 
In addition to a patent’s relative strength—or perhaps because of it—
patent rights are the most time-limited of the lot.  The patent term generally 
lasts twenty years from the date of filing.54  In contrast, copyright 
protection lasts much longer—usually, the author’s life plus seventy 
years.55  And trade secrets may last longer still, as they have no set time 
limit (e.g., the over-century-old Coca-Cola formula).  Trade secrets do not 
expire after a particular term of years but continue indefinitely until the 
secret is publicly disclosed.56 
Because patent law relies on the PTO’s ex ante evaluation of an 
invention’s benefit to society, “[i]t is relatively less amenable than 
copyright to adjusting the scope of the right once granted.”57  That said, 
patent law does impose some ex post limits.  For example, the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents and experimental use defenses (though narrowly 
applied) can excuse defendants from liability due to certain socially 
beneficial uses of the patented invention.58  More recently, in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C. decision,59 
courts increasingly consider a patent defendant’s socially beneficial use 
when assessing remedies. 
Copyright law imposes more rigorous ex post limits than patent—
notably, the fair use defense.60  Curiously, trade secret law, which is similar 
to copyright in terms of easy acquisition and subject matter breadth, does 
not have a comparable fair use doctrine.  Although trade secret law has a 
reverse engineering defense (which has been analogized to copyright fair 
use61), it is inapplicable in a number of cumulative innovation and First 
Amendment contexts.62  Trade secret law’s relative indifference to the 
defendant’s beneficial use of proprietary information can be contrasted with 
copyright law—and, to a lesser degree, patent law. 
 
 53. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990); see also 
Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 12 
(2007). 
 54. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a). 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
 56. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 58; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate 
Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623 (2013) (arguing that trade secret’s 
perpetual nature makes it a preferable form of protection for corporations, which are also 
perpetual in nature). 
 57. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1185. 
 58. See infra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing the reverse doctrine of equivalents and 
experimental use defenses). 
 59. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 60. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 61. See Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 328 (2005) (noting “[t]he 
counterpart to fair use in trade secret law is the right to unmask a trade secret by reverse 
engineering”). 
 62. See infra Part III. 
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B.   Understanding Theoretical Underpinnings 
The scope-limiting doctrines of patent, copyright, and trade secret are 
discussed in Part II.  Before exploring these limiting doctrines, however, it 
is important to understand the theoretical underpinnings of patent, 
copyright, and trade secret, for one cannot understand why trade secret law 
warrants ex post limits without first understanding the purposes that these 
intellectual property laws are meant to serve. 
1.   Incentives Justification of Patent and Copyright Laws 
The primary justification for patent and copyright laws in the United 
States is a utilitarian one:  to provide economic incentives to create.  Patents 
and copyrights are viewed as tools to correct the public goods problem 
inherent in information production.  Information is nonrivalrous (i.e., 
consumption by more than one person does not deplete the amount 
available to others) and nonexcludable (i.e., once information embodied in a 
book or patented invention is released, it is hard to exclude others from its 
benefits absent payment).  Thus, by obtaining rights to exclude for a set 
period of time, creators and inventors can recoup their investments, and 
society is guarded against the underproduction of information-based 
goods.63 
But rights to exclude impose social costs as well, including “the 
deadweight loss of monopoly pricing and the resulting limitations of 
dissemination.”64  Inventions and creative works are by their very nature 
cumulative—they build on prior works.  Thus, intellectual property law 
aims to strike a balance between rewarding the originator of a particular 
invention or creative work, without stifling the ability of second-comers to 
create new works.  Since copyright law restricts access to creative and 
intellectual works, it must also contend with First Amendment concerns, 
like “protecting political speech, promoting democracy or self-government, 
furthering the search for truth, or enhancing autonomy and enabling self-
expression.”65 
Given this quest for balance, patents and copyrights are limited in scope 
and duration.  These limitations allow others to freely use protected works 
once intellectual property rights have expired, to improve on existing 
works, and to comment on and criticize existing works.66  Through its 
 
 63. This theory is emphasized both in the Constitution and numerous judicial decisions. 
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to enact patent and copyright 
laws “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts”); see also WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 74–76 (2003) (explaining intellectual property law’s optimization task).  The 
descriptive and prescriptive limitations of this theory—in capturing the actual dynamics of 
creation—are a matter of spirited debate among intellectual property scholars. 
 64. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 16. 
 65. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:  How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech 
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 538 (2004); see also Edward Lee, 
Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 (2010). 
 66. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 991 (1997). 
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threshold requirements and ex post limiting doctrines, copyright and patent 
laws “seek[], in the aggregate, to guard against both over- and 
underprotection of information relative to the social optimum and the 
concomitant social costs associated with each state.”67  To achieve this 
balance, copyright and patent laws use both statutory provisions and 
common law doctrines to adjust the scope of owners’ rights. 
As discussed in the previous section, copyright does not ask many 
questions ex ante, before the initial grant, while patent does.  But in both 
contexts, the role of ex post limits has become increasingly important.68  
Intellectual property rights have increased in breadth, scope, duration, and 
strength in recent decades.  This trend is reflected most vividly perhaps by 
Congress’s twenty-year extension of the copyright term.69  Historically, 
intellectual property’s quest for balance and concomitant limits were built 
into the shape of the initial grant (e.g., a shorter term of protection for 
copyright).  But that seems less true today.  Thus, attention is increasingly 
shifting to the post-grant stage of intellectual property rights—i.e., shaping 
liability and remedy determinations to assure that intellectual property law 
continues to “serve the finite, instrumental function it was designed to 
serve.”70  In this Article, I argue that these concerns also apply to trade 
secret law, despite the muddier nature of trade secret law’s theoretical 
underpinnings, which are discussed in the next section. 
2.   Competing Theories of Trade Secret Law 
The theoretical justifications and normative foundations for protecting 
trade secrets have puzzled courts and scholars for over a century.71  
Because of trade secret law’s unique characteristics—including the 
requirement of relative secrecy and its concern with how the defendant 
obtains the information (i.e., misappropriation)72—it has proven difficult to 
elicit scholarly agreement on the theoretical justifications for trade secret 
law and its place within existing legal doctrine.  The confusion surrounding 
trade secret law has earned it colorful nicknames, from “the Cinderella of 
 
 67. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1183. 
 68. Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 665–66. 
 69. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 108, 203, 301–304 (2012)).  Thus, while the 
original U.S. copyright term was fourteen years (with a fourteen-year renewal term), the 
current term is the life of the author plus seventy years. 
 70. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2004); see also David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 
IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1800 (2013) (“As copyright trends in a more expansive direction, the 
likelihood that unauthorized uses may be formally infringing but still socially beneficial 
grows ever greater.”). 
 71. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 312–14 (2008). 
 72. Unlike trade secrets, copyrights and patents are said to confer property rights 
“against the world”; that is, for the most part, they prohibit unauthorized use regardless of 
the relationship between the parties or how the information is obtained. See infra Part II.C. 
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the intellectual property law field,”73 to a “chameleon,”74 to a “real toad[] in 
a conceptual garden.”75 
One predominant view “emphasizes deterrence of wrongful acts and is 
therefore sometimes described as a tort theory” of trade secret law.76  Under 
this tort view, “the aim of trade secret law is to punish and prevent illicit 
behavior, and even to uphold reasonable standards of commercial 
behavior.”77  The Supreme Court embraced such a view in an early 
twentieth century case, E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland.78  
In that case, the Court viewed as the “starting point” of the offense the 
defendant’s acquisition of information through his “confidential relations 
with the plaintiffs,” rather than whether the information at issue qualified as 
a trade secret.79 
The tort-based view of trade secret found voice in the 1939 Restatement 
(First) of Torts.80  In its “ultimate expression,” the tort view would replace 
an independent trade secret law with “a general tort of wrongful 
misappropriation of information.”81  While the tort view continues to have 
some traction with courts and scholars,82 its detractors emphasize the 
 
 73. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Cinderella of Intellectual Property Law, in 2 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:  ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 399 
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). 
 74. Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon, or Intellectual Property Olympian?  A 
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (1999). 
 75. Todd M. Sloan, Trade Secrets:  Real Toads in a Conceptual Garden, 1 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 113 (1973). 
 76. Lemley, supra note 71, at 319.  Related to the tort-based view, another recurring 
explanation for trade secret law during much of the twentieth century has been norm-based:  
to maintain “standards of commercial ethics,” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 
470, 481 (1974), and “to recognize and enforce higher standards of commercial morality in 
the business world,” E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 
(5th Cir. 1970) (quoting Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958)). See 
also Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge:  Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in 
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 
441, 446 (2001) (describing the historical role of commercial morality in trade secret law). 
 77. Lemley, supra note 71, at 319. 
 78. 244 U.S. 100 (1917). 
 79. Id. at 102.  The Court explained: 
The word property as applied to . . . trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of 
certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some 
rudimentary requirements of good faith.  Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable 
secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special 
confidence that he accepted.  The property may be denied but the confidence 
cannot be. 
Id. 
 80. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) (noting that trade secret law 
is different from patent and copyright because “[i]t is the employment of improper means to 
procure the trade secret, rather than the mere copying or use, which is the basis of the 
liability under the rule stated in this Section”). See generally id. §§ 757–759. 
 81. Lemley, supra note 71, at 321. 
 82. See, e.g., Chiappetta, supra note 74, at 73 (arguing that trade secret law is best 
explained and rationalized by reference to tort law); Pamela Samuelson, Information As 
Property:  Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual 
Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 366 (1989) (advocating the tort view); see also C. 
Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine:  Common Law 
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unprincipled line-drawing the tort view invites:  instead of resolving 
“challenges on any principled basis,” courts make “ad hoc judgments based 
on their perception of the defendant’s intent.”83  Interestingly, the 1979 
Restatement (Second) of Torts omitted trade secret law “on the grounds that 
[it] had developed into an independent body of law that no longer relied on 
general principles of tort law.”84 
Another predominant theory justifying trade secret law has been the 
property theory—i.e., that trade secrets are property rights, owned and 
possessed by the plaintiff.85  Under this view, “[t]he starting point . . . is not 
whether there was a confidential relationship, but whether, in fact, there was 
a trade secret to be misappropriated.”86  The property view of trade secret 
was dominant in the nineteenth century,87 before Masland and the ascent of 
the tort view.  The Supreme Court revived the property view in Ruckelshaus 
v. Monsanto Co.88 
 
Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 56, 59 (1987) (proposing an 
extension of the tort view of trade secrets). 
 83. Lemley, supra note 71, at 322; see id. at 322–23 (noting the tort theory “leaves a 
zone of uncertainty around business behavior that is likely to discourage robust competition 
by companies who fear that competition may later be deemed unfair” and “may also have 
similar deterrent effects on departing employees”); see also Claeys, supra note 32, at 7 
(arguing that the tort view is “obviously unsatisfying” because “‘improper means’ gets 
specification from some set of normative principles alien to tort”). 
 84. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 35–36; see supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 85. Lemley, supra note 71, at 324. See generally Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept 
of Trade Secrets in Anglo-American Law:  An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313 
(1997) (offering a critical analysis of trade secrets as property).  A few courts and 
commentators have offered a “contract view” of trade secret law, suggesting that trade secret 
law is (or ought to be) synonymous with contract. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at 
Trade Secret Law:  A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998).  
However, as detractors of this theory have noted, a contract-based theory is descriptively 
incomplete as it cannot account for the subset of trade secret cases that establish rights 
between strangers who have no contractual privity—e.g., “improper means” cases and cases 
in which a trade secret is acquired by accident or mistake. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 32, at 
11; Lemley, supra note 71, at 323. 
 86. Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 780 (Pa. 1965). 
 87. The property view is sometimes traced to Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868), 
a seminal nineteenth-century trade secret case.  Peabody claimed a secret process for 
manufacturing gunny cloth and sought to enjoin a former employee, Norfolk, who had quit 
and begun planning to build a competing factory.  The court justified its grant of injunctive 
relief on the existence of a property right, observing: 
If [a man] invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, 
whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an exclusive right to 
it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; 
but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who 
in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own 
use, or to disclose it to third persons. 
Id. at 458.  In these early American trade secret cases, however, the label “property” likely 
“meant something rather different than it means to many people today, and often little more 
than that the right was to be protected by the injunctive power of courts in equity.” Lemley, 
supra note 71, at 324. 
 88. 467 U.S. 986 (1984); see id. at 1002–03 (holding that trade secrets are property 
under the Fifth Amendment takings inquiry); see also Cohen, supra note 17, at 195 (“In 
time, this malfeasance-based [or tort-based] view of trade secret theft went into retreat, and 
the law looped back toward a property-based theory.”). But see Claeys, supra note 32, at 9 
(suggesting that the “property view remains out of favor”). 
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In Monsanto, the Court addressed whether a federal law requiring 
Monsanto to publicly disclose its trade secrets was a Fifth Amendment 
“taking of private property” that merited compensation.89  In holding that 
trade secrets were property for takings purposes, the Court explained:  
“Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of 
property,” like assignability, and a “perception of trade secrets as property 
is consonant with a notion of ‘property’ that extends beyond land and 
tangible goods and includes the products of an individual’s ‘labor and 
invention.’”90  A number of federal and state court decisions describe trade 
secrets as a form of “property,”91 and the 1979 UTSA, enacted by a 
majority of states, is also said to embody a property view of trade secrets.92 
The property view of trade secrets (and the Supreme Court’s 
characterization in Monsanto) has come under fire from various quarters.93  
Some of these criticisms echo those levied against property 
characterizations of any informational assets (including patents, copyrights, 
and trademarks).  For example, critics of the property view emphasize the 
inherent differences between trade secrets and tangible property.  That is, 
like other forms of information, trade secrets are not rivalrously consumed, 
so there is no danger of overuse or of a “tragedy of the commons,” in the 
tangible property sense.94 
Commentators have also criticized the use of tangible property metaphors 
in the trade secret context (as in other information contexts) because such 
property-speak seems to bolster normative claims that owners should have 
stronger rights to exclude.95  In previous work, however, I have argued that 
such criticisms of property metaphors misperceive property law.  Far from 
being exclusively fixated on exclusion, a number of tangible property law 
doctrines “seek[] to balance exclusionary rights of owners against 
competing equity and efficiency concerns.”96  And in the trade secret 
context, it is the tort-based approach that may, in fact, have an expanding 
 
 89. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998–1004. 
 90. Id. at 1002–03. 
 91. See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 28, §§ 2.01–.02 (listing cases describing trade secrets as 
property). 
 92. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 71, at 324–25; Lynn C. Tyler, Trade Secrets in 
Indiana:  Property vs. Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 339, 339 (1998). 
 93. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 82, at 366. 
 94. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 95. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 82, at 398–400 (critiquing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s property characterization of trade secrets in Monsanto and observing that “the word 
property is a very powerful metaphor that radically changes the stakes in legal disputes”); 
see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property:  Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1756–57 (2007) (describing others’ criticisms of the 
property analogy). 
 96. Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 665.  In recent years, a number of intellectual 
property law scholars have begun to highlight the relevance of tangible property law to 
intellectual property law discourse by emphasizing the various limits tangible property law 
imposes on owners. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 70, at 47–48; Peter Lee, The Accession 
Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175, 193 (2011); Molly 
Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 906 (2008). See generally 
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). 
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(rather than, cabining) effect, because “[c]ourts that think of trade secret 
law as a common law tort . . . are apt to overlook” the substantive 
requirements of demonstrating a valid trade secret “in their zeal to reach 
‘bad actors.’”97 
A few scholars, like Pamela Samuelson, have also attacked the property 
view of trade secret because the law’s concern with the plaintiff’s 
reasonable secrecy efforts and the defendant’s method of acquisition 
prevents a trade secret from being a “good against the world” in the tangible 
property sense.98  However, other types of intellectual property, like 
copyrights and trademarks, also require ongoing acts by owners for 
protection (e.g., continued use in one’s business for trademark protection) 
and certain acts by defendants (e.g., copying in copyright) before liability 
will attach. 
3.   Utilitarian Justification:  Trade Secret As Intellectual Property 
Increasingly, courts and scholars emphasize trade secret’s proper role as 
a subset of intellectual property because, like patent or copyright, the grant 
of exclusivity is meant to combat the underproduction of information-based 
goods.99  In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,100 for example, the Supreme 
Court identified the incentive-to-invent justification as a key purpose of 
trade secret law.  Holding that patent law did not preempt trade secret law, 
the Court explained: 
[T]he patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the 
existence of another form of incentive to invention. . . .  Trade secret law 
will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and 
will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and 
 
 97. Lemley, supra note 71, at 313–14; see also Tyler, supra note 92, at 340–41. 
 98. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1125, 1153 & n.148 (2000); see also Claeys, supra note 32, at 9–10. 
 99. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (observing 
that trade secret law helps ensure that “the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if 
not quite patentable, invention[s]” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 
485 (1974))); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 
1991) (explaining trade secret law’s role in providing “incentives to invest resources in 
discovering more efficient methods of production”); DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 
P.3d 1, 13 (Cal. 2003) (“By creating a limited property right in information, trade secret law 
‘acts as an incentive for investment in innovation’” (quoting Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, 
Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property:  The Clash Between Intellectual Property and the 
First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 1, 60 (2001))); Cohen, supra note 17, at 196 (noting that courts “often analyze the 
protection of trade secrets the way they analyze protecting patent or copyright, emphasizing 
the social benefits of rules that promote innovation”); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional 
Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 58 (2004); 
Schwartz, supra note 56, at 632 (noting that “[t]here is essentially only one policy purpose 
behind trade secret law:  the encouragement of innovation”). But see Risch, supra note 53, at 
26 (arguing that “creating incentives to innovate is a very minor justification of trade secret 
law”). 
 100. 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). 
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exploitation of his invention.  Competition is fostered and the public is not 
deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patentable, invention.101 
Indeed, the broad definition of a trade secret allows it to reach into places 
patent law cannot (e.g., business, as opposed to technical information, and 
“negative know-how”).  And trade secrets are significantly cheaper than the 
costly patent application process, which is why “some firms, particularly 
start-ups, rely heavily on the incentive to invent provided by trade secret 
law.”102  But some have questioned the adequacy of the incentive-to-invent 
explanation for trade secret law.  For instance, firms have adequate 
incentives to create certain trade secret-protected information even in the 
absence of trade secret law—e.g., customer lists, marketing data, and 
negative know-how.103  (Though the same may be said of certain kinds of 
patentable information as well.104)  And to some extent, “trade secret law 
runs the risk of undermining the socially beneficial incentives of the patent 
system,” as it is premised on secrecy rather than disclosure.105 
Interestingly, Mark Lemley has recently argued that trade secrets are best 
understood as intellectual property rights not only because they promote 
inventive activity (i.e., by encouraging invention in areas where patent law 
does not reach) but also because they promote disclosure of that activity.106  
The disclosure function is also an important purpose of intellectual property 
law.107  Patent law, for example, requires an applicant to describe her 
invention so that a person of ordinary skill in the field can make and use it, 
and it requires that the information be published.108  While trade secret 
protection seems to cut in the opposite direction—as the right is conditioned 
on relative secrecy—Lemley argues that it actually reduces over-investment 
in secrecy.  This over-investment may take the form of increased walls and 
fences or business decisions that restrict the flow of information between 
potential partners or new employees.109  Trade secret law developed as a 
(partial) substitute for these restrictions.  In this way, trade secret law may 
“encourage[] disclosure of information that companies might otherwise be 
 
 101. Id. at 484–85 (emphasis added). 
 102. Lemley, supra note 71, at 331. 
 103. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 85, at 272. 
 104. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 651 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“Many have expressed serious doubts about whether patents are necessary to encourage 
business innovation. . . .  ‘[C]ompanies have ample incentives to develop business methods 
even without patent protection . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dan L. Burk & Mark 
A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1618 (2003))). 
 105. Bone, supra note 85, at 270; see also Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations 
of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1807–10 (2014) (reiterating the concerns raised 
in his original article). 
 106. See generally Lemley, supra note 71. 
 107. Id. at 332. 
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 109. Lemley, supra note 71, at 335 (“Examples can be found as far back as the guild 
system . . . .  [I]n the absence of legal means to protect [technical] knowledge [guilds] went 
to great lengths to prevent others from learning of it, imposing draconian limits on the 
mobility of employees . . . .”). 
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reluctant to share for fear of losing the competitive advantage it 
provides.”110 
These incentive-based justifications for trade secret law are not without 
their critics.111  But the “intellectual property view” of trade secrets 
increasingly reflects the modern view.  Trade secrets are routinely described 
and treated as a form of intellectual property by courts, scholars, and 
practitioners.  Despite this characterization, however, trade secret law does 
not have limiting doctrines akin to those of patent and copyright—i.e., 
doctrines sufficiently attuned to cumulative innovation and First 
Amendment concerns. 
II.   DEFINING AND LIMITING THE SCOPE OF EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS 
Scope-limiting doctrines in intellectual property law mitigate the risk of 
overprotection.  In theory, they try to reconcile owners’ rights to exclude 
with the public’s interest in furthering innovation and access.  One 
particular concern of limiting doctrines in intellectual property is the issue 
of cumulative innovation—i.e., new works that build on existing works.  As 
Maureen O’Rourke observes, “[v]irtually since their inception, both the 
copyright and patent laws have grappled with the question of how to 
safeguard the incentive inherent in the grant of exclusive rights while at the 
same time allowing second-comers to build on prior works.”112 
Patent law’s limiting features, like the reverse doctrine of equivalents113 
and recent developments in patent remedies, largely arose to address these 
cumulative innovation concerns.  These limitations supplement the legwork 
done by patent’s onerous ex ante requirements (and the reevaluation of 
patent validity by courts).114  Limiting doctrines in copyright like the idea-
expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use also arose, in large part, 
to address these cumulative innovation concerns.115  So, too, did trade 
secret’s reverse engineering defense.116  In the copyright and trade secret 
contexts, however, limiting doctrines must do more of the heavy lifting, 
because the ex ante requirements are minimal.  Copyright law is thus a 
particularly useful point of comparison for trade secret law.  As I 
 
 110. Id. at 335–36; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 
177 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that “disclosure . . . is often necessary to the efficient exploitation 
of a trade secret”). 
 111. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 85, at 273 (criticizing this incentive-based justification 
for “ignor[ing] enforcement costs and underestimat[ing] the transaction costs of licensing, 
both of which are likely to be especially high when secret information is involved”); see also 
Bone, supra note 105, at 1809 (noting that “even if trade secret law limits the precaution-
stealing arms race, it adds a new detection-avoidance arms race”). 
 112. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1180. 
 113. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 114. In patent infringement cases, defendants often invoke the invalidity of the patent.  
Thus, courts must reassess the validity of a patent in the context of patent infringement 
litigation. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
 115. See infra Part II.B; see also O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1180 (noting that copyright 
fair use arose “in part, and is justified, as a mechanism to overcome market failures that 
would otherwise prevent socially desirable uses of the protected work from occurring”). 
 116. See infra Part II.C.1. 
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demonstrate in the sections that follow, trade secret’s limiting doctrines are 
insufficiently solicitous of cumulative improvement. 
In addition to cumulative innovation concerns, copyright’s fair use 
defense also arose to reconcile copyright with First Amendment purposes, 
like promoting public commentary and debate.117  Because patent law 
focuses on technological inventions as protectable subject matter rather than 
expressive works, the First Amendment does not pose much of a concern—
or doctrinal challenge—in patent law.  Trade secret law, however, with its 
staggering subject matter breadth, straddles the line between the two.  But it 
has no comparable limiting doctrine to accommodate First Amendment 
concerns.118 
A.   Cumulative Innovation and Limiting Doctrines in Patent Law 
To understand the role that limiting doctrines play in patent law, one 
must first understand the basics of patent infringement analysis and the role 
of patent claims.  Because patent claims mark the “metes and bounds” of 
the owner’s right to exclude, patent infringement analysis looks to the 
claims rather than what the patentee has built or is selling.  To infringe a 
patent, the accused product or process must contain each and every element 
identified in the patent claim (or its equivalent).119  As a result, an accused 
product can “literally infringe” (i.e., fall within the literal language of a 
claim), even if the defendant makes a different and better product than the 
inventor.  Even if a defendant’s product or process does not literally 
infringe the claims of a patent, the doctrine of equivalents can expand the 
reach of a patent to encompass “insubstantial differences.”120  Patent claims 
can thus “reach new and unanticipated inventions made after the patent 
issues.”121 
Potential users and follow-on improvers face significant uncertainty 
regarding the scope of a patent and whether it encompasses their desired 
uses.  Sometimes, subsequent innovators cannot avoid falling within the 
claims’ literal terrain, because the claims are broadly defined or “because 
economic or technical necessity requires that the improver hew closely to 
the work of the original creator in some basic respect.”122  Patents can thus 
frustrate cumulative innovation and retard the efforts of those who seek to 
improve existing inventions.123 
 
 117. See Tushnet, supra note 65, at 538. 
 118. For a discussion of conflicts between trade secret law and the First Amendment, see 
generally Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and 
the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (2007). See also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 
147, 165 (1998). 
 119. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29–30 (1997). 
 120. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 959–60 (2007); Lemley, supra note 66, at 1004. 
 121. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1005. 
 122. Id. at 991. 
 123. Cumulative innovation is not a monolithic concept.  In patent law, it can mean 
inventing a better functioning or more efficient version of an existing invention.  In this way, 
1422 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
In assessing patent infringement, courts generally do not consider the 
value of the infringer’s contribution—for example, if an existing product or 
process is made more efficient or commercially valuable.124  Since it is the 
language of the patent’s claims, rather than what the inventor has actually 
built, that defines the boundaries of the right to exclude, an inventor can 
expand the bounds of his patent right by drafting broad claims.  To be sure, 
a patentee’s ability to draft broad claims is cabined by the various 
requirements of patentability (e.g., novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, 
and written description).125  And in the context of infringement litigation, 
courts can reassess the PTO’s decision to grant a patent—i.e., the validity of 
the patent.126 
But provided the requirements of patentability are met, subsequent 
innovators seeking to incorporate or build upon the patented invention must 
be careful to avoid infringing upon the claims’ literal terrain.  It may be that 
the subsequent innovator’s contribution is significant enough to merit a 
patent on the improvement.  Even then, however, the subsequent innovator 
cannot practice the patent absent a license from the original patentee.127  
Provided licensing markets operate efficiently, subsequent innovators can 
obtain licenses from originators, and improvements will find their way to 
the marketplace.  And where the subsequent innovator has a patent on the 
improvement, she comes into the negotiation game with some power of her 
own because the original patentee cannot practice the improvement without 
getting the improver’s permission.128  This so-called “blocking patents” 
situation is thought to encourage a cross-licensing agreement between the 
parties, so both can practice the improved invention.129 
However, a number of scholars have persuasively illustrated the various 
challenges to efficient licensing that can impede holders of “blocking 
patents” from successfully negotiating a license.  These challenges include:  
identifying the relevant parties; uncertainty as to patents’ value and scope; 
and strategic behavior that is exacerbated in the context of bilateral 
 
the later innovator “designs over” an existing patent, perhaps without any awareness that the 
prior invention exists or is patented. Lee, supra note 96, at 184.  Commentators have referred 
to interference with this kind of cumulative innovation as an “intergenerational bottleneck,” 
which occurs where “each product generation builds on its predecessor.” Carrier, supra note 
70, at 46–47.  Cumulative innovation can also mean finding a new use for a patented 
invention or using patented inventions “as inputs into producing other inventions.” Lee, 
supra note 96, at 184.  Some commentators have referred to interference with this kind of 
innovation as an “intragenerational bottleneck,” which occurs when “one product contains 
multiple patented components and one of the patent holders refuses to license one of the 
patented parts,” thus preventing the practice of the product. Carrier, supra note 70, at 46; see 
also Burk & Lemley, supra note 104, at 1657–58. 
 124. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1006–08. 
 125. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 & n.21 (1990); see also Lemley, supra note 66, at 1001–
02. 
 126. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
 127. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1009–10. 
 128. Id. at 1007–13 (offering a useful framework for understanding how patent law 
differentiates between “minor” and more “significant” technological improvements). 
 129. See id. at 1009–10. 
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monopolies and that can obstruct agreement, even where there is a 
cooperative surplus.130  Absent a license from the originator, the subsequent 
innovator whose contribution has been deemed significant enough to merit 
a patent is out of luck—i.e., she cannot practice the improvement patent and 
reap the benefits of her productive efforts. 
Given these cumulative innovation concerns, certain limiting doctrines in 
patent law consider whether the socially beneficial nature of the defendant’s 
use should excuse liability or alter the remedial preference for injunctive 
relief.131 
1.   Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents 
One such limiting doctrine is the “reverse doctrine of equivalents” 
(RDOE), a mechanism by which courts can theoretically excuse “radical” 
improvers from infringement liability.132  Under the RDOE, a literal 
infringer can be excused from liability where her product is “so far changed 
in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar 
function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the 
literal words of the claim.”133 
The Supreme Court introduced the RDOE in Westinghouse v. Boyden 
Power Brake Co.134  Boyden was accused of infringing Westinghouse’s 
patent on a train brake.  But Boyden’s brake offered vastly superior 
stopping power compared to its predecessors, allowing the long trains of the 
nineteenth century to be operated more safely.135  Unfortunately for 
Boyden, Westinghouse’s patent was worded broadly, and Boyden’s 
improvement fell within the literal language of Westinghouse’s claims.  The 
Court refused to find infringement, however, setting forth a new exception 
to liability.136 
Commentators have suggested that in the context of radical 
improvements (e.g., a train brake with far superior stopping capability), 
courts should be unwilling to tolerate the possibility of market failure (e.g., 
bargaining breakdown between patent owner and improver) and the 
resulting dampening of incentives for inventors to improve radically on 
existing patented technologies.137  Courts can thus use the RDOE as a 
 
 130. See, e.g., id. at 1048–61; Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Bargaining Breakdown:  The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 84–91 (1994) 
(describing licensing failures between pioneer patent holders and improvers in the early 
radio and steel industries and the resulting social welfare losses). 
 131. Several commentators, however, have argued that existing ex post limiting doctrines 
in patent law are too narrow and have suggested various reforms to expand these limiting 
doctrines. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 16 (proposing a fair use–type defense to patent 
infringement); Katherine Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 289 
(2011) (proposing a fair use–type infringement exception). 
 132. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 66, at 1010–13; Merges, supra note 130, at 78. 
 133. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950). 
 134. 170 U.S. 537 (1898). 
 135. Id. at 545. 
 136. Id. at 568, 573. 
 137. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 66, at 1010–13; Merges, supra note 130, at 91. 
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policy lever to “benefit[] radical improvers at the expense of the original 
patentee, and so encourage[] radical improvements.”138  Even absent court 
action, the RDOE may “provide the infringer with a negotiation threat 
credible enough to increase the probability that the parties will conclude a 
licensing agreement.”139  In recent times, however, courts rarely apply the 
RDOE,140 which has prompted calls to resuscitate the doctrine.141 
2.   Experimental Use Defenses 
To some extent, experimental use defenses also consider an infringing 
defendant’s socially beneficial use of a patented invention.  The statutory 
experimental use defense excuses drug manufacturers from infringement 
liability for uses of another’s patent that are “reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”142  This defense allows 
drug manufacturers to use others’ patented inventions when testing drugs 
they are planning to submit for the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
approval.143  In addition, the common law defense of experimental use 
permits one to use another’s patented invention solely for purposes of 
scientific inquiry.144  This defense is quite narrow, in that it does not apply 
to uses for any commercial, financial, or reputational gain.145  Historically, 
 
 138. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1012–13. 
 139. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1194. 
 140. Scholars have observed that the RDOE is “seldom used” and “largely moribund.” 
Lee, supra note 96, at 189; Merges, supra note 130, at 91.  In 2002, the Federal Circuit 
appeared to sound the RDOE’s death knell. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface 
Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  But it has since backed away 
from such forceful disavowals of the RDOE’s continuing applicability.  Recently, in Depuy 
Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamore Danek, Inc., the Federal Circuit recognized the continuing 
viability of the doctrine but nonetheless emphasized the rarity of its application. 567 F.3d 
1314, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  In this case, the district court imposed a significant penalty 
on the defendant for raising an RDOE argument. See id. at 1322.  The Federal Circuit 
reversed, explaining that the “unusual nature of the [RDOE] is not itself a reason to sanction 
a party for invoking it.  The Supreme Court has recognized it to be a viable defense, even if 
it is rarely asserted.” Id. at 1339. 
 141. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 125, at 864–68; Varadarajan, supra note 10, 
at 689–91, 707–09. 
 142. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).  Originally, this provision was enacted in the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 202, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–302 
(2012). 
 143. This permission to use another’s patent even extends to preclinical and other 
experiments that the manufacturer decided not to present to the FDA. See Merck KGaA v. 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–08 (2005); see also Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. 
Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (extending the defense to 
post-approval experiments). 
 144. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining the 
defense does not extend to uses “in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s . . . business 
and . . . not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry”). 
 145. See id.; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:  
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1989) (proposing an 
expansion of this defense to “exempt[] the use of patented inventions in research from 
infringement liability”). 
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“[a]cademics working in different basic science areas” have been “the 
primary beneficiaries of this defense.146 
3.   Remedial Flexibility in Patent 
To be sure, the RDOE and the experimental use defenses are narrow.147  
And given the “all-or-nothing” nature of these patent defenses, courts may 
be wary of applying them.  That is, should a defendant successfully assert 
one of these defenses, she is excused from liability and the patent owner 
gets nothing.148  Increasingly, courts evaluate the beneficial nature of the 
defendant’s use in the context of assessing remedies, rather than liability 
determinations—a trend that can be traced to the Supreme Court’s 2006 
eBay v. MercExchange decision. 
Historically, patent rights have been protected by a “property rule,”149 
with courts awarding injunctive relief to the patent owner as a matter of 
course in patent infringement actions.  But in eBay, the Supreme Court 
rejected an automatic injunction rule in patent cases, opting instead for the 
four-part analysis that guides courts’ injunction decisions in a wide variety 
of cases.150  Injunctive relief is still largely the norm in patent infringement 
cases, but a notable concurrence by Justice Kennedy (and joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) has prompted district courts to consider the 
beneficial nature of a defendant’s use in certain contexts.151 
 
 146. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1483, 1500–01 (2013). 
 147. The narrowness of these ex post doctrines has prompted some scholars to argue for a 
broader, fair use–type defense in patent law. See O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1208; 
Strandburg, supra note 131. 
 148. See Lee, supra note 96, at 239. 
 149. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972).  A property 
rule gives the property owner a veto over nonconsensual transfers; potential takers must get 
the owner’s consent and pay the owner’s price.  A liability rule, by contrast, merely 
compensates the right holder for the violation; the owner has no veto power, and the non-
holder can take the entitlement in exchange for a court-determined price. 
 150. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  In this case, eBay 
and its subsidiary Half.com infringed MercExchange’s business method patent on an 
electronic market.  The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of permanent 
injunctive relief for the patentee, applying its “general rule that courts will issue permanent 
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.” Id.  The Supreme 
Court reversed the Federal Circuit, clarifying that even if patents are indeed property, “the 
creation of a [property] right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that 
right.” Id. at 392.  A plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy 
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction. 
Id. at 391. 
 151. The case also included a concurrence authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined 
by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, which suggested that given the “long tradition of equity 
practice” in patent infringement cases, and the “difficulty of protecting a right to exclude 
through monetary remedies,” injunctive relief should predominate as the preferred remedy 
for patent infringement. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
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First, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggested the sufficiency of 
damages in one kind of cumulative innovation context:  “[w]hen the 
patented invention is but a small component of the [defendant’s] 
product.”152  In such cases, where “the threat of an injunction is employed 
simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be 
sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not 
serve the public interest.”153  District court decisions post-eBay suggest that 
consideration of certain kinds of beneficial use and improvement by the 
defendant will play a bigger role in the remedies analysis than has 
historically been the case.154 
Second, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggests that injunctive relief 
should be rejected where a non-practicing patent assertion entity (e.g., a 
“patent troll”) seeks to enforce a patent against a defendant that is practicing 
the patent (e.g., creating and selling a product that incorporates the patented 
technology).  “Patent trolls” are firms that “use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing 
fees.”155  This distinction is not a consideration of technological 
improvement but rather commercial improvement.  Namely, the infringing 
defendant is practicing the patent and commercializing a product, while the 
plaintiff is not.  Empirical evidence suggests that, after eBay, district courts 
are less likely to grant injunctive relief in cases where the patent holder is a 
patent troll.156 
B.   Cumulative Innovation, the First Amendment, 
and Limiting Doctrines in Copyright 
While patent infringement analysis asks whether a defendant’s product 
falls within the claim language, copyright infringement analysis asks 
whether the defendant’s work (1) derives from (i.e., copies) the copyrighted 
work and (2) is “substantially similar” to protected expression in the 
 
 152. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 153. Id. at 396–97. 
 154. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).  
In z4, the court denied permanent injunctive relief to the owner of patented software 
activation technology against the manufacturer of infringing software products that 
contained the patented technology, explaining: 
 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy instructed courts to be cognizant of the 
nature of the patent being enforced . . . .  Here, product activation is a very small 
component of the Microsoft Windows and Office software products that the jury 
found to infringe z4’s patents.  The infringing product activation component of the 
software is in no way related to the core functionality for which the software is 
purchased by consumers.  Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s comments support the 
conclusion that monetary damages would be sufficient to compensate z4 for any 
future infringement by Microsoft. 
Id. at 441 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 395–97). 
 155. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396. 
 156. John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113 
(2007); see also Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules 
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 800 (2007) (arguing that “courts should cast a 
skeptical eye at claims for injunctive relief where the patent owner is not a direct competitor 
of the defendant”). 
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copyrighted work.157  The requirement of copying means that copyright law 
excuses independent creators from liability—a feature it shares with trade 
secret and a notable difference from patent law.158 
In the easiest copyright infringement case, the defendant copies verbatim 
the plaintiff’s entire work.  But infringement is not limited to such cases.  It 
is possible to infringe a copyright by copying a mere portion of the work, 
like a few seconds of a song or a chapter from a novel, or even nonliteral 
aspects of the protected work, such as the plot outline or fictional characters 
in a movie.159 
One important scope-limiting doctrine in copyright is that protection 
extends only to the author’s original expression of a work, not to the 
underlying ideas, facts, or functional elements of a work.160  This limitation 
acts to “draw the line between copyright and patent, as well as between 
copyright and the public domain.”161  It is, however, notoriously difficult to 
apply in practice.  The Copyright Act also designates some specific subject-
matter exemptions, immunizing from liability the public performance or 
display of work in the course of “face-to-face teaching activities,” religious 
services, and transmission to the blind, among other exemptions.162 
Finally, defendants can raise the affirmative defense of fair use, an 
equitable defense that excuses infringement.  Oft described as the “most 
troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright,”163 fair use is 
undoubtedly the “most important—and amorphous—limitation on the 
otherwise extraordinarily broad rights granted to copyright owners.”164  Fair 
use is “perhaps the most crucial policy tool for maintaining copyright’s 
intended balance.”165 
1.   Fair Use 
The fair use doctrine permits courts to gauge the merits of a defendant’s 
otherwise infringing use in the context of liability determinations.  If a use 
 
 157. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 158. Copying can be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s access 
to the work and similarity between the two works.  Because copyright infringement requires 
copying, independent development of a work is a complete defense—though unintentional or 
subconscious copying is not. See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 
420 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that George Harrison’s unintentional 
copying of “He’s So Fine” in his composition “My Sweet Lord” was infringement). 
 159. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 499; Mark A. Lemley, What’s Different About 
Intellectual Property, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1116 (2005). 
 160. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 161. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1187; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104–05 
(1879) (explaining the distinction between a book that can be protected by copyright versus a 
system—in this case, for a bookkeeping method—that could only be protected, if at all, by 
patent law). 
 162. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1), (4), (8). 
 163. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) 
(quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)). 
 164. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 551, 551 (2008). 
 165. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1483, 1495 (2007). 
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is deemed fair, then the defendant need not compensate the copyright 
owner. 
Congress codified the doctrine in 1976 but did not precisely define “fair 
use.”  Instead, the preamble to section 107 of the Copyright Act describes 
various examples of fair use, including use of the copyrighted work “for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”166  But there 
are no presumptive categories of fair use.  In any case where fair use is 
asserted, courts must consider the following four nonexclusive factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.167 
The last “market harm” factor includes not just actual market harm caused 
by the particular infringement but also the potential for lost sales of the 
original work if the challenged use becomes widespread and the potential 
adverse impact on licensing fees and markets for derivative works (e.g., 
adaptations of the original).168 
The Supreme Court has also explained that “transformative uses” of the 
copyrighted work—i.e., those that “add[] something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message”—are particularly favored under the first factor and, 
relatedly, are presumed to cause less market harm under the fourth 
factor.169  The Court identified certain critical uses like parody as “ha[ving] 
an obvious claim to transformative value . . . [as] it can provide [a] social 
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a 
new one.”170  In setting forth this doctrine, the Court explained: 
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding 
of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is 
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.  Such works 
 
 166. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566–67 (1985).  A 
“derivative work” is defined in the Copyright Act to include any form in which a work may 
be “recast, transformed, or adapted,” including translations, dramatizations, motion picture 
versions, abridgements, and the like. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  A few decades ago, the Supreme 
Court deemed factor four “the single most important element of fair use,” and suggested that 
“[f]air use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially 
impair the marketability” of the copied work. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566–67.  The 
importance of this factor has diminished with the Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
“transformative use” doctrine. See infra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 169. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  In Campbell, the 
Court considered whether 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh Pretty 
Woman,” was a fair use.  In concluding that the Court of Appeals erred in deeming 2 Live 
Crew’s parodic use presumptively unfair, the Supreme Court laid out the standard for 
“transformative use.” 
 170. Id. 
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thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space 
within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new 
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.171 
The transformative use inquiry has become an important aspect of fair use 
analysis.  In those cases where the defendant’s otherwise infringing use was 
deemed transformative, “it exerted nearly dispositive force not simply on 
the outcome of factor one but on the overall outcome of the fair use test.”172 
The fair use doctrine serves dual purposes:  it is an “important safety 
valve[]” both for “promoting cumulative creativity and free expression.”173  
As the Supreme Court has observed, the “latitude for scholarship and 
comment traditionally afforded by fair use” helps reconcile the Copyright 
Act with the First Amendment.174  Also, fair use (and in particular, the 
focus on “transformative use”) has been justified as a way to avoid market 
failure that would otherwise prevent socially desirable uses of the protected 
work.175  For example, copyright owners have noneconomic reasons to 
prohibit certain transformative uses, especially parodic or critical uses—and 
may be unwilling to license their works for such uses, at any price.  At the 
same time, such uses have positive externalities that the transformative user 
cannot capture, making her unwilling to pay for a license.176 
 
 171. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 172. Beebe, supra note 164, at 605. 
 173. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 609. 
 174. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (describing fair use doctrine and the 
idea/expression distinction as “copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards”); A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“[F]ree speech concerns are 
‘protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine.’” (quoting Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999))).  However, some scholars 
have argued that copyright law is fundamentally at odds with the First Amendment, despite 
the existence of a fair use defense. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:  
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002). 
 175. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure:  A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 
1614 (1982) (“Fair use should be awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement 
action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to the defendant is socially 
desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of 
the plaintiff copyright owner.”); cf. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 557, 560 (observing that “the 
scope of fair use is shrinking because courts and commentators have adopted the idea that 
fair use is only relevant for instances of market failure”; while this is “good news for cultural 
critics, . . . it makes many traditionally fair uses, such as pure copying carried out for 
teaching and research purposes, look unfair”). 
 176. See Gordon, supra note 175, at 1632–35.  This is one kind of market failure.  Other 
kinds of market failure include cases where high transaction costs stand in the way of private 
bargaining.  For example, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the 
Supreme Court declined to enjoin Sony from selling VCRs to consumers, who could record 
unauthorized copies of copyrighted broadcasts; the Court held the copying to be fair use. 464 
U.S. 417, 456 (1984).  As commentators have observed, “[t]hat consumers would face 
insurmountable transaction costs in identifying, contacting and contracting with the 
individual copyright owners for permission to tape helps to account for the holding.” 
O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1189. 
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The claim for fair use thus seems to be strongest when “a copyright 
owner upset by a critical message attempts to suppress it.”177  An example 
of such a use is Alice Randall’s retelling of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With 
the Wind from the perspective of a black character, as a critique of racism 
and the “myth of white Southern gentility” in the original.178  Not only do 
such uses implicate market failure concerns, they are “analogous to the 
speech of political protesters attacking received wisdom, whose actions are 
generally thought to be at the heart of the First Amendment’s 
protections.”179  However, increasingly, fair use encompasses 
transformative, noncritical uses that provide widespread educational and 
informational benefits—as demonstrated by the recent Google Books 
case,180 and other cases involving searchable databases that incorporate 
images of copyrighted works.181 
2.   Remedial Flexibility in Copyright 
Like patent defenses, the fair use defense is all-or-nothing in nature.  That 
is, if courts apply it, the copyright owner gets no remedy at all—an outcome 
that some courts and commentators have criticized.182  If a court decides 
fair use does not apply, then a copyright owner will often get an injunction 
and damages.183  “Rejecting a claim of fair use thus gives the copyright 
owner both the right to compensation for the defendant’s use and the right 
to prevent or control the circumstances of that use,” through injunctive 
relief.184 
In patent law, some notable shifts in the remedial landscape have taken 
place post-eBay, as discussed above.  The impact of eBay on the 
development of copyright remedy determinations, however, is less clear.185  
 
 177. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 549. 
 178. Id. at 551; see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269–71 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
 179. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 549. 
 180. See generally Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 181. For example, a district court recently deemed Google’s scanning of twenty million 
books into a search index a fair use, due largely to its educational and informational value. 
See id. at 293 (noting Google Books’ “significant public benefits” as a “research tool” for 
students, teachers, librarians, and scholars, as well as its ability to “preserve[] books, in 
particular out-of-print and old books that have been forgotten” and to “facilitate[] access to 
books for print-disabled and remote or underserved populations”). 
 182. See Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513, 525–27 (1999) (arguing that fair use should be rejected, along with 
injunctive relief, and copyright owners should only be entitled to actual damages); see also 
Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies As a Means to Counteract Failures in Copyright 
Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that courts should change their “all-
or-nothing” approach to copyright remedies and make the range of remedies more flexible). 
 183. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (2012) (providing for injunctive relief, as well as 
damages equal to “the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the 
infringer” or “statutory damages”). 
 184. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 156, at 791. 
 185. See, e.g., Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay:  An Empirical Study, 16 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215, 218 (2012) (“An empirical study of all post-eBay copyright 
injunction decisions up to June 1, 2010 indicates that the majority of post-eBay decisions on 
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Even prior to eBay, however, the Supreme Court has suggested the potential 
flexibility of copyright remedies in certain beneficial use contexts—i.e., 
cases where the social benefits associated with an infringing use may not 
merit excuse from liability but would nonetheless justify a court’s refusal to 
grant injunctive relief.186  And, to some degree, copyright law already relies 
on liability rules by imposing compulsory licenses for certain categories of 
uses, like non-commercial broadcasting.187 
C.   Cumulative Innovation, the First Amendment, 
and Trade Secret’s Relatively Limited Limiting Doctrines 
Once a plaintiff demonstrates she has a trade secret (i.e., information of 
value that is not generally known or readily ascertainable, and is the subject 
of reasonable secrecy precautions), for liability to attach she must also 
prove the defendant “misappropriated” it.  Acquisition, use, or disclosure of 
the trade secret is misappropriation only where it involves “improper 
means” or a breach of confidence.188 
 
copyright injunction still totally ignored the eBay decision as well as the four-factor test 
advocated therein.”). But see Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We hold 
today that eBay applies with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for 
alleged copyright infringement.”). 
 186. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).  In Tasini, freelance writers who 
had written articles for the New York Times sought to enjoin the newspaper’s unauthorized 
republication in electronic databases. Id. at 457.  The Court found infringement, but was 
nonetheless sympathetic to the defendants’ arguments that electronic databases provided a 
valuable service by providing easy access to newspaper texts going back several decades. Id. 
at 505–06.  The Court encouraged the trial court to alter the traditional remedy of injunctive 
relief and fashion a solution—like instructing parties to arrive at an ongoing royalty 
agreement—that would allow the public to benefit from a more complete electronic 
database. Id.  Notably, the Court observed:  “[I]t hardly follows from today’s decision that an 
injunction against the inclusion of these Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance 
articles in any databases) must issue.” Id. at 505; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (noting in dicta that the “goals of the copyright law . . . 
are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief”). 
 187. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2012); see also id. §§ 111(d) (cable television), 114(d) (certain 
digital audio transmissions), 115 (phonorecords of nondramatic musical works), 119 (certain 
satellite retransmissions).  Compulsory licenses give copyright owners the right to 
compensation for use, but not injunctive relief; thus, they cannot refuse consent for such 
uses. 
 188. The UTSA § 1 defines “misappropriation” as: 
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to 
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or 
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied 
consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the 
trade secret; or (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know 
that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a person 
who has utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances 
giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or 
through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his position, knew or 
had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been 
acquired by accident or mistake. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990). 
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“Improper means” have been found in various situations, including theft, 
fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone 
wires, eavesdropping, or other forms of espionage.189  But there is no 
“complete catalogue” of improper means.  The term is fairly broad and does 
not require an act to be independently actionable.190  Absent improper 
means, a defendant’s use or disclosure of the trade secret may be wrongful 
because it violates an implied duty (e.g., an employee’s implied duty not to 
disclose the employer’s secrets) or explicitly violates a nondisclosure 
contract.  Cases involving departing employees make up the bulk of trade 
secret litigation.191 
Because trade secret law protects against breaches of express or implied 
duties of confidentiality, trade secret law overlaps to some degree with 
contract law principles.192  However, trade secret law departs from contract 
law in significant ways.  Notably, trade secret liability can extend to 
strangers not in privity with the plaintiff, including improper-acquirers, 
accidental-acquirers,193 and those who knowingly or negligently obtain 
information from one in privity with the plaintiff.194 
To the extent that the defendant’s alleged use of the information does not 
result in an identical product or process, courts employ the “substantial 
derivation” doctrine to assess whether the defendant has misappropriated 
the plaintiff’s trade secret—or whether “the contribution of the claimed 
trade secret to the [defendant’s] end result is relatively trivial, such that the 
defendant can be said to have acted independently.”195  In some ways, 
substantial derivation analysis attempts to do what copyright infringement 
analysis does—i.e., assess whether the defendant, in fact, improperly relied 
upon plaintiff’s work.  Unlike copyright infringement analysis, however, 
courts’ substantial derivation analysis lacks clarity and uniformity.  Some 
courts, in assessing whether the defendant’s use substantially derived from 
the plaintiff’s information, “have used as analogy the patent law’s ‘doctrine 
of equivalents,’ focusing on whether the defendant’s process seeks to 
 
 189. Id. § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 437. 
 190. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. f, at 10 (1939)).  Here, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the defendants misappropriated trade secrets when they engaged in the fully legal 
act of taking aerial photographs of the plaintiff’s engineering plant while it was under 
construction.  In that case, the court explained that “‘improper’ will always be a word of 
many nuances, determined by time, place, and circumstances.” Id. at 1017. 
 191. See generally MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 85–89; Lemley, supra note 71, at 
318. 
 192. Some commentators have suggested that trade secret law is (or should be) 
coextensive with contract. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 193. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(C), 14 U.L.A. 437. 
 194. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B), 14 U.L.A. 437.  Thus, if an employee leaves employer A, then takes 
a trade secret to employer B, B can be held liable for using the trade secret despite B’s lack 
of privity with A, so long as B knew or should have known that the employee had a duty of 
confidentiality to A. 
 195. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 6.03[4], at 6-35; see also Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca 
Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (granting summary judgment for the 
defendant where the “defendant independently created the allegedly misappropriated item 
with only ‘slight contribution from the plaintiff’s trade secret’”). 
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achieve the same result by performing substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way as does [the] plaintiff’s.”196  Other courts seem 
to employ the “substantial similarity” analysis of copyright law.197  Still 
other courts employ a more relaxed and vague standard of mere 
“similarity.”198 
The ad-hoc nature of substantial derivation analysis means that the 
infringement net can be cast wide—encompassing a defendant’s end 
product or process that is quite different from the original.  It is sufficient 
that the defendant “has exploited the information in some way that either 
harms the owner or provides an advantage to the defendant”—for example, 
by using the trade secret information as a “starting point” to “assist or 
accelerate research.”199  And the “defendant cannot avoid liability by 
showing that it has created a modified or improved product or process, if 
there was any substantial derivation from the plaintiff’s information.”200 
1.   Reverse Engineering 
Trade secrecy “defenses” (to the extent they can be labeled as such) tend 
to blur into an element of a trade secret claim.201  One “defense” is prior 
publication of the secret.  If, for example, the alleged trade secret was 
published in a patent or in a trade journal before the defendant got her hands 
on it, the information is not “secret” and thus falls outside the scope of 
protectable subject matter.202  Other defenses focus on the defendant’s 
method of acquisition—i.e., proper, as opposed to improper, ways of 
obtaining secret information.  For example, similar to copyright, if the 
defendant independently discovered the secret, she is not liable.  The most 
significant trade secret defense, however, is reverse engineering of a 
product to discover how it works. 
Reverse engineering has long been a permissible way to obtain a trade 
secret, provided that the “acquisition . . . [is] by fair and honest means, such 
as purchase of the item on the open market.”203  The Supreme Court in 
 
 196. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 6.03[4], at 6-33. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.; see also Stomback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 305–06 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984); Motorola, Inc. v. Computer 
Displays Int’l, Inc., 739 F.2d 1149, 1157 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 199. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 6.03[4], at 6-33; see also N. Petrochemical Co. v. 
Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1059 n.2. (7th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he evidence is clear that [the 
plaintiff’s process] served as the cornerstone for any modified process which [defendant] 
intends to use.”). 
 200. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 6.03[4], at 6-33; see also Mangren Research & Dev. Co. v. 
Nat’l Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 201. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 76 (classifying “proper means” as “defenses” 
because “they do not directly deny the existence of a trade secret or the defendant’s use of 
the secret”). 
 202. Generally, publication (e.g., in an academic journal or in a patent) destroys the 
secret.  Thus, an inventor must usually “elect” either patent or trade secret protection. See, 
e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Agro v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 203. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437, 438 (1990). 
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Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,204 described reverse 
engineering as “an essential part of innovation” that “may lead to 
significant advances in the field.”205  And absent a reverse engineering 
exception, trade secret law could “undermine federal patent policy because 
it would ‘convert the . . . trade secret into a state-conferred monopoly akin 
to the absolute protection that a federal patent affords.’”206  The reverse 
engineering defense is an important limitation on the rights of trade secret 
owners—and one that is concerned with the cumulative nature of 
innovation.  Despite scholarly suggestions that it plays a similar role to 
copyright fair use,207 however, the defense is not applicable in a number of 
cumulative innovation and First Amendment–related contexts (as illustrated 
in Part III). 
2.   Defenses Relevant to First Amendment/Public Interest Concerns 
In the copyright context, fair use doctrine plays a pivotal role in 
reconciling copyright law with the First Amendment and addressing 
cumulative creation concerns.  In trade secret law, reverse engineering 
speaks to the latter.  But it is underinclusive—that is, the reverse 
engineering defense does not consider the social benefits of a defendant’s 
use or disclosure if the information was acquired in any way other than 
reverse engineering.  Nor does the reverse engineering defense reconcile 
trade secret law with the First Amendment—for example, where 
unauthorized disclosures of protected information are made for the purpose 
of educating the public about health and safety concerns. 
Trade secret law is not entirely silent on the issue of balancing rights of 
trade secret owners against the public’s interest in disclosure.  For example, 
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition notes:  “[T]he disclosure of 
another’s trade secret for [a purpose] other than commercial exploitation 
may implicate the interest in freedom of expression or advance another 
significant public interest.”208  The Restatement further observes:  “A 
privilege is likely to be recognized, for example, in connection with the 
disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the 
commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public 
concern.”209  Despite this comment in the Restatement, however, courts 
 
 204. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 205. Id. at 160 (noting that “the competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a 
spur to the inventor” to develop ideas that are patentable); see also Samuelson & Scotchmer, 
supra note 11, at 1582–90 (describing justifications for the right to reverse engineer). 
 206. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 11, at 1584 (quoting Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 
676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 207. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 61; Samuelson, supra note 118, at 788 (suggesting that 
trade secret defenses and the requirement of defendant misappropriation perform similar 
functions as limiting doctrines of copyright law, but noting that “[a]s trade secret rights in 
information get stronger, tensions between trade secret law and the First Amendment are 
likely to increase”). 
 208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995). 
 209. Id.  In relevant part, comment c notes: 
The scope of liability at common law and under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act for 
disclosures that do not involve commercial exploitation of the secret information is 
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rarely invoke it to excuse unauthorized disclosures of trade secrets for 
public interest purposes.210  Since most states have adopted the UTSA as 
statutory law, the Restatement  has had little impact on the development of 
trade secret law and “is frequently disregarded.”211  The UTSA does not 
incorporate a First Amendment or public interest privilege. 
On the rare occasions when First Amendment interests are explicitly 
considered by courts, it is usually in the context of preliminary injunction 
decisions as part of a prior restraint analysis.212  But even these prior 
restraint cases demonstrate confusion and inconsistency as to the level of 
“public concern” that must be implicated, the relevance of the discloser’s 
purpose, and whether the defendant must be an established news 
organization to trigger First Amendment scrutiny.213  The general 
reluctance of courts to consider speech concerns in trade secret cases is 
perhaps attributable to a perception that trade secrets are property or 
“commercial” speech, and thus less relevant to First Amendment 
 
unclear. . . .  [T]he disclosure of another’s trade secret for purposes other than 
commercial exploitation may implicate the interest in freedom of expression or 
advance another significant public interest.  A witness who is compelled by law to 
disclose another’s trade secret during the course of a judicial proceeding, for 
example, is not subject to liability.  The existence of a privilege to disclose 
another’s trade secret depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, 
including the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the 
means by which the actor acquired the information.  A privilege is likely to be 
recognized, for example, in connection with the disclosure of information that is 
relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to 
other matters of substantial public concern. 
Id.  Some whistle-blowing statutes also excuse employee disclosures of trade secret– 
protected information in connection with exposing a violation of state or federal law. See, 
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (prohibiting employer retaliation against employees who 
provide information about fraud against shareholders by publicly traded companies); see 
also 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2012) (prohibiting employer retaliation against employees who 
disclose information “reasonably believe[d]” to be a violation of law or “a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety,” so long as “such disclosure is not specifically 
prohibited by law”; however, the latter condition is presumably violated when disclosure is 
prohibited by trade secret law). 
 210. A Westlaw search of federal and state cases invoking the “public interest” language 
of this Restatement comment resulted in a single case:  Merckle GmbH v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 961 F. Supp. 721, 735 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that a competitor’s alleged use of a 
drug manufacturer’s trade secrets for the purpose of litigating patent infringement claims 
against the manufacturer in Germany did not further a substantial public interest and was not 
privileged). 
 211. See Seaman, supra note 28, at 14. 
 212. Preliminary injunctions (not permanent injunctions) that restrain speech are 
generally deemed unconstitutional “prior restraints.” See generally Martin H. Redish, The 
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 
(1984).  The concern underlying the prior restraint doctrine is that preliminary injunctions 
suppress lawful speech “before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First 
Amendment.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376, 390 (1973).  By contrast, permanent injunctions restraining speech are generally viewed 
as constitutional because they follow a court’s final determination that speech is unprotected. 
 213. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994); DVD Copy Control 
Assoc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 15–17 (Cal. 2003); see also infra note 274 and accompanying 
text. 
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interests.214  Or perhaps the lack of an explicit framework for analysis (akin 
to copyright’s multifactor test) makes courts wary of excusing trade secret 
defendants from liability for First Amendment/public interest reasons, 
because there is no shared understanding of when such an exception should 
apply. 
3.   Remedial Flexibility in Trade Secret 
Like patent and copyright, injunctive relief is the primary form of relief 
for trade secret misappropriation.215  In addition to injunctive relief, trade 
secret remedies also include damages measured by either the plaintiff’s loss 
or the defendant’s profits attributable to the trade secret (or both).216  In 
certain contexts, trade secret misappropriation is even subject to criminal 
sanction.217 
In civil trade secret cases, the factual issue most pertinent to the remedies 
decision is whether the secret information has been publicly disclosed.  
Where the defendant has already publicly disclosed the information “so that 
its value is destroyed,” the plaintiff’s remedy is for money damages.218  But 
where the defendant seeks to keep using a trade secret that has not been 
publicly disclosed or where disclosure is threatened, injunctive relief is 
usually awarded as a matter of course.219  Because trade secret disputes 
often arise between competitors, and neither wants to destroy the secret’s 
 
 214. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
562–63 (1980) (explaining that commercial speech is entitled to less protection than other 
kinds of speech, such as political speech).  Some scholars have argued that trade secrets are 
best characterized as “property” and, thus, should be immune from First Amendment 
scrutiny altogether. See, e.g., Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 99, at 5.; Richard A. Epstein, 
Privacy, Publication and the First Amendment:  The Dangers of First Amendment 
Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1037 (2000). 
 215. See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade:  Tactical and Legal 
Considerations from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 REV. LITIG. 729, 807 (2010) 
(noting that “[i]njunctive relief is the normal and primary remedy granted in trade secret 
cases, for the obvious reason that a secret once lost is forever lost”); see also FMC Corp. v. 
Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that 
loss of trade secret status cannot be remedied by money damages, as a secret once lost is 
“lost forever”).  Unlike copyright, trade secret does not have compulsory licensing 
categories. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Lemley, supra note 71, at 319. 
 217. In 1996, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), which for the first 
time imposed federal criminal penalties for intentional and knowing theft or unlawful 
disclosure of trade secrets. Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012)).  The EEA criminalizes “two types of trade secret theft:  
(1) espionage on behalf of a foreign entity, and (2) theft of trade secrets for pecuniary gain.” 
Seaman, supra note 28, at 17.  However, the EEA “has not been widely used by federal 
prosecutors.” Id. at 18. 
 218. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 7.01, at 7-2 to -3. 
 219. Id. § 7.02[2], at 7-7 (noting that injunctive relief is often the preferred remedy 
“[b]ecause exclusivity is the hallmark of value, and because damages are difficult to identify 
and measure”).  Under the UTSA, a reasonable royalty is permitted instead of an injunction 
only in “exceptional circumstances.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(b) (amended 1985), 14 
U.L.A. 437, 449 (1990). 
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value by publishing it, injunctive relief is “the most sought after, and most 
important, remedy in trade secret misappropriation cases.”220 
A trade secret injunction can sweep quite broadly. Depending on the 
circumstances, the injunction may curb not only the use of the secret by the 
defendant but also the manufacture of a product that encompasses the 
secret—where, for example, the acquired secrets may have become 
“inextricably connected” with the defendant’s process.221  If the secret was 
used for producing component parts, the court might restrain the defendant 
from making the entire product or even similar products.222 
As discussed in the previous sections, eBay’s impact on patent (and to a 
lesser extent, copyright) cases has been to make the remedies analysis more 
searching.  Rather than presuming irreparable harm upon a showing of 
patent infringement, courts assess the potential value of the defendant’s 
unauthorized use relative to the harm caused to the plaintiff, as well as the 
public interest.223  The impact of eBay on trade secret cases is more 
dubious.224  This is particularly so given that trade secret cases are often 
litigated in state, rather than federal, courts.225 
The Second Circuit’s approach, which applies increased scrutiny for 
injunctive relief in trade secret cases, seems unusual in this regard.  In 
Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp.,226 the plaintiff sought 
injunctive relief against the defendant for its use of “know-how” relating to 
subway train brakes.227  The Second Circuit explained that a presumption of 
irreparable harm was inappropriate in cases where the defendant is likely to 
use the trade secret for her own profit motives rather than disseminate it.  In 
 
 220. David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency, in TRADE 
SECRECY, supra note 21, at 406, 439. 
 221. See, e.g., Gen. Electric Co. v. Sung, 843 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. Mass. 1994); ILG 
Indus. Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396–97 (Ill. 1971). 
 222. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 7.02[2], at 7-30. 
 223. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 224. See, e.g., E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 
706–07 (E.D. Va. 2012) (applying Virginia’s equity principles, which presume irreparable 
harm when the trade secret statute is violated, instead of the four-factor standard for 
injunctive relief announced in eBay); see also Seaman, supra note 28, at 60–61 (contrasting 
the relative difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief in the patent context against the trade 
secret context). 
 225. In federal cases, the law of the forum state applies with respect to substantive issues 
(e.g., definition of a trade secret misappropriation and damages), but as to procedural issues, 
including the standards for issuing injunctions, federal law applies. POOLEY, supra note 4, 
§ 7.02[2], at 7-10 n.22 (citing Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 
(11th Cir. 1991)). But see E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (choosing 
to apply Virginia’s standard for issuing injunctions). 
 226. 559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 227. See id. at 114.  These subway train brakes are known as “Brake Friction Cylinder 
Tread Break Units” (BFC TBU)—known to the rest of us as “that loud squeaking, sparking 
braking system that so reliably stops the New York City Transit subway system.” Id. at 113.  
The plaintiff Faiveley sued the defendant, who following the termination of a licensing 
agreement to use the technology, began to develop its own line of BFC TBU. Id. at 114.  
Faiveley sought preliminary injunctive relief to prevent the defendant “from manufacturing 
or marketing BFC TBU or disclosing to third parties any trade secrets associated with BFC 
TBU,” which the district court granted. Id. at 115. 
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such cases, the “misappropriator will often have the same incentive as the 
originator to maintain the confidentiality of the secret in order to profit from 
the proprietary knowledge,” and thus, monetary damages are adequate to 
make the plaintiff whole.228 
III.   ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIFFERENCES:  
ARE EXISTING TRADE SECRET LIMITS SUFFICIENT 
TO ADDRESS CUMULATIVE INNOVATION AND SPEECH CONCERNS? 
This part highlights a number of real world examples where trade secret 
law’s existing limits may prove insufficient to reconcile cumulative 
innovation and speech concerns.  Such examples include situations where 
(1) information claimed as trade secrets has been used for purposes of 
significant technological “improvement” (e.g., making a product or process 
more efficient, expanding interoperability, or revealing glitches or security 
flaws in a product), and (2) information claimed as trade secrets potentially 
affects public health, safety, or welfare. 
A.   “Improvement” Cases 
One subset of problematic trade secret cases involves significant 
“improvers” of protected information.  The trade secret improvement 
context presents challenges to efficient licensing and risks of market failure 
not unlike its patent and copyright counterparts.229  In fact, the secrecy 
aspect of the information may create particular impediments to efficient 
licensing—for example, greater uncertainty as to the information’s value 
and scope.230 
To be sure, defining and gauging “improvement” in the intellectual 
property context is a difficult endeavor.231  The breadth of trade secret 
subject matter renders unlikely any single definition of improvement or an 
exhaustive list of improvement scenarios.  But insofar as the subject matter 
at issue is of a technical nature, one can look to patent law’s conception of 
 
 228. Id. at 119.  The court noted:  “A rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm might be 
warranted in cases where there is a danger that . . . [the defendant] will disseminate those 
secrets to wider audience or otherwise irreparably impair the value of those secrets.” Id. at 
118.  In Faiveley, such a presumption—and consequently, injunctive relief—was 
unwarranted because the defendant was likely to treat the trade secret–protected information 
“with the same confidentiality that they give to their own proprietary information.” Id. at 
119. 
 229. See supra notes 130, 176 and accompanying text. 
 230. Pooley, for example, observes the reluctance of trade secret owners to reveal 
information in licensing negotiation.  And because the prospective licensee is often 
“considering developing its own technology in house,” the licensee is reluctant to expose 
employees who are best equipped to assess the licensor’s technology to it for fear that 
“exposing them to the secrets of the prospective licensor might taint them and engender 
subsequent litigation if the technology ultimately is developed in house.” POOLEY, supra 
note 4, § 6.05, at 6-44. 
 231. See Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 684 (observing that fuzziness of intellectual 
property boundaries and the array of protectable subject matter makes consideration of 
“improvement” in intellectual property less straightforward than the tangible property law 
context). 
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cumulative improvement for guidance.232  Specifically, the improvement 
scenarios presented below involve the use of trade secret–protected 
information to make a product or process more efficient, to expand 
interoperability, or to reveal flaws in a product or process.233 
For the purpose of illustrating the first of these scenarios, consider the 
train brake example posed at the outset of this Article.  Suppose Allen, an 
employee of Company A, works on developing an improved subway train 
brake.  In the course of his employment, he learns of negative know-how 
relevant to the project.  Company A decides to shelve the project, focusing 
on more profitable avenues of research and development.  Allen leaves to 
work for Company B, heading a team that is tasked with developing an 
improved subway train brake.  Relying on the negative know-how he 
obtained from his previous employment, Allen guides his new team away 
from research avenues that proved unsuccessful at Company A and 
develops a more efficient, better-operating train brake that proves a market 
success.  If Company A sues Allen and/or Company B for trade secret 
misappropriation, Company A would have a successful claim in many 
jurisdictions.  As for the remedy, Company A would likely be able to secure 
an injunction for a limited period of time (a “head start” injunction), which 
would prevent Company B from selling their product for a period of time 
sufficient to compensate for the misappropriation.234  And, as discussed in 
Part II, no clear limiting doctrines in trade secret law require courts to ask 
whether Company B’s substantial improvement of the trade secret merits 
either excuse from liability or, alternatively, departure from a property rule 
in favor of a liability rule (e.g., a reasonable royalty remedy).235 
Analogizing this scenario to the patent context, negative know-how 
would not be protectable in the first instance under patent law.236  But 
suppose it was; or suppose in this hypothetical, it was knowledge of a 
successful manufacturing process that Allen had taken with him.  Such a 
manufacturing process could form the subject of a patent.  If Company B’s 
improved version of the train brake employed a mechanical process that 
infringed Company A’s patented process, then patent limiting doctrines, 
like the RDOE or (more likely) the remedies analysis post-eBay, would 
provide a vehicle for examining the nature and significance of the 
 
 232. In patent law, when courts and commentators refer to improvement or cumulative 
innovation, they usually mean one of the following:  (1) using the patented component as an 
input into producing another invention; (2) finding a new use for a patented invention; or 
(3) coming up with a more efficient or better functioning version of an existing invention. 
See supra note 123. 
 233. These examples are meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.  Nor should all 
improvements falling within these parameters trigger exceptional treatment under trade 
secret law.  Indeed, the significance of the defendant’s improvement is an important 
consideration under the proposed trade secret fair use analysis described in Part IV. 
 234. See, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 142 
(9th Cir. 1965) (upholding district court’s “head start” injunction); see also MERGES ET AL., 
supra note 17, at 116. 
 235. See supra Part II.C. 
 236. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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improvement.237  But if Company A chose to protect the information under 
trade secret law, such improvement-oriented limiting doctrines would not 
apply. 
Moving from mechanical inventions to the computer software context, 
suppose the trade secret defendant uses protected information (not obtained 
through reverse engineering) to enhance interoperability of new products 
with existing platforms.  In some cases, technology providers use 
intellectual property (and contract) law to restrict others from learning the 
interfaces and protocols required for interoperability.238  Daniel Laster has 
observed, for example, that Apple uses various methods to prevent others 
from accessing the requisite information to develop products that can 
interoperate with its iTunes platform.239  This limits consumers’ choice of 
products that can work on preexisting platforms.240 
Or consider the former employee who uses knowledge of trade secrets to 
conduct testing of a product in order to identify glitches or security 
problems that need correcting for consumers’ benefit.  This scenario is, 
once again, particularly relevant to the software context.  As Derek E. 
Bambauer and Oliver Day have observed:  “[S]ome researchers may switch 
sides, working first as an employee or consultant, and then moving to 
perform independent testing.”241  In such cases, “the software company 
may have a plausible claim that the researcher’s work is influenced by her 
knowledge of the firm’s trade secrets.”242  Even nonemployee users may be 
similarly restricted from testing software if they are subject to end-user 
 
 237. See supra Part II.A. 
 238. See, e.g., Daniel Laster, The Secret Is Out:  Patent Law Preempts Mass Market 
License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 621, 642 (2006) (arguing the use of contract law to enforce mass market licenses 
barring reverse engineering for interoperability purposes “subverts the fundamental principle 
of trade secret law that a competitor is free to [reverse engineer] a product which is publicly 
available in the marketplace”; the use of contract law to expand trade secret protections in 
this way has turned it into a “nation-wide property right without any of the limitations built 
into other IP regimes”). 
 239. Id. at 622.  “Apple has elected to keep the iTunes platform closed . . . and does not 
publish the interface specifications needed for a competitor to develop a product to 
interoperate with iTunes.  It is for this reason that a consumer who wishes to use iTunes must 
acquire an iPod, rather than some device of a third party.” Id. at 635. 
 240. This issue has been further complicated by the enactment of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1988 (DMCA). Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1202 (2012)).  The DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions “create[] an 
extremely strong form of trade-secret-like protection for technical protection measures, far 
beyond that provided by any other law.” Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 11, at 1646.  
Ordinarily, an unpatented technical measure would be subject to reverse engineering, but the 
DMCA provisions “effectively insulate makers of technical protection measures from 
competitive reverse analysis.” Id.  Certain exceptions to the DMCA’s anticircumventions 
rule do permit reverse engineering to achieve interoperability among programs, but they 
have been interpreted quite narrowly. Id. 
 241. Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1077 
(2011). 
 242. Id.; see also id. at 1053, 1077 (describing one notorious example where a former 
Cisco employee discovered flaws in Cisco’s internet routers, which endangered “a wide 
swath of internet infrastructure”; Cisco argued, plausibly, “that his work was influenced by 
exposure to Cisco’s proprietary information”). 
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license agreements that forbid reverse engineering.243  These parties use 
trade secrets to test software and find security flaws; thus, their goal is not 
to develop competitive products but rather “to improve [the software’s] 
resilience and robustness.”244 
B.   First Amendment Interests:  Promoting Disclosure of Information 
Related to Public Health, Safety, and Welfare Concerns 
In addition to cumulative innovation concerns, another set of problematic 
cases concerns trade secret law’s role in preventing public access to 
confidential information that implicates public health, safety, and welfare.  
In various contexts, federal and state governments can require companies to 
disclose proprietary information for regulatory purposes—for example, 
requiring drug companies to disclose information to the FDA for drug 
approval.245  But many of the controversies described below involve trade 
secret law’s prohibitive effect on the public’s ability to access information 
relevant to health, safety, and welfare.  The absence of robust limiting 
doctrines in trade secret law affects the public’s ability to access such 
information, through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests as well 
as employee and third-party disclosures. 
1.   Scholarly Work Demonstrating Trade Secret Law’s Prohibitive Effect 
on Public Access to Relevant Information 
Trade secret law is a relatively undertheorized area—especially when 
compared to patent or copyright.  In recent years, however, a growing 
number of scholars have highlighted the increasing tension between trade 
secret law and the public’s interest in accessing information pertinent to 
health, safety, and welfare—for example, information concerning health 
care, the environment, voting machines, and search engine algorithms.246  
These examples highlight the extent to which industries depend on “trade 
secrecy as a cornerstone of [their] intellectual property scheme[s],”247 
sometimes with the goal of consumer and regulatory obfuscation, rather 
than protection from competitors.  Together, these industry-specific studies 
paint a picture of trade secret law that has grown in breadth and influence, 
without a concomitant adjustment of doctrinal limits. 
In the health care context, for example, Annemarie Bridy has criticized 
efforts by medical device manufacturers to guard information regarding 
prices paid by hospitals.  In criticizing the Guidant Corporation’s use of 
 
 243. Id. at 1078.  Here, too, as in the interoperability context, the interplay of trade secret 
and contract law can be particularly problematic.  Software vendors often include language 
in end-user license agreements forbidding reverse engineering.  Such a contractual obligation 
“might be sufficient to make a software user responsible for maintaining the trade secret.” Id. 
at 1076. 
 244. Id. at 1078. 
 245. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, 
in TRADE SECRECY, supra note 21, at 467. 
 246. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 247. Levine, supra note 21, at 641. 
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trade secret law to prevent disclosure of certain medical device pricing, 
Bridy observes: 
  The aim of Guidant’s legal efforts has been to prevent device buyers—
usually group purchasing organizations, health systems, or individual 
hospitals—from shopping device prices, which they have routinely done 
by sharing price-paid information among themselves, hired health care 
consultants, and subscription-based benchmarking services . . . which 
exist to help hospitals hold down their supply costs. . . .  Guidant’s desire 
to conceal the prices hospitals pay is thus motivated not by the concern 
that competitors will acquire and use the information to their economic 
advantage, which is the traditional concern in trade secrets cases, but by 
the concern that customers will.248 
Bridy argues that such efforts, “if . . . ultimately accepted by courts, could 
have profound implications . . . for the health care market, including the 
market for pharmaceuticals.”249 
Other commentators have described the role of trade secret law in 
impeding public efforts to access information regarding harmful effects of 
breast implant devices250 or the disclosure of raw data that is submitted to 
the FDA by pharmaceutical companies.251  As Rebecca Eisenberg observes:  
“Disclosure of data from clinical trials would permit more users to learn 
more from it, allowing them to make better informed choices about current 
treatments and future research, as well as permitting better public oversight 
over regulatory decision-making.”252 
In the environmental context, Mary Lyndon has described trade secret 
law’s role in restricting public access to the composition and health effects 
of discharged chemicals.  Various industries, from cosmetics to pesticides 
to hydraulic “fracking,” utilize processes that introduce chemicals into the 
environment.253  A particularly stark example occurred earlier this year, 
when Freedom Industries, a supplier of coal processing compounds, caused 
a chemical leak in West Virginia’s Elk River.  The leak contaminated 
Charleston’s water supply, leaving 300,000 residents without usable water 
 
 248. Bridy, supra note 5, at 191. 
 249. Id. at 192. 
 250. See Margaret Witherup Tindall, Breast Implant Information As Trade Secrets:  
Another Look at FOIA’s Fourth Exemption, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 213, 224 (1993); see also 
Anderson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 939–40 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing FOIA request for documents submitted to the FDA by a manufacturer of silicone 
breast implants). 
 251. Eisenberg, supra note 245, at 471.  Congress has thus far “stopped short of calling 
for disclosure of raw data that are submitted to the FDA.” Id.  Eisenberg argues:  “[I]t is 
difficult to justify the continuing treatment of data submitted in pursuit of regulatory 
approval as trade secret or confidential information belonging to the submitter.” Id. at 469.  
Recently, Johnson & Johnson announced that it would voluntarily “mak[e] all of its clinical 
trial data available to scientists around the world.” See Harlan M. Krumholz, Give the Data 
to the People, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, at A23. 
 252. Eisenberg, supra note 245, at 470–71. 
 253. See Mary L. Lyndon, Trade Secrets and Information Access in Environmental Law, 
in TRADE SECRECY, supra note 21, at 442. 
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and many seeking medical attention.254  Despite these health effects, 
Freedom insisted that the specific make-up of its coal-processing 
compounds were protected trade secrets and successfully delayed disclosing 
them to the public.255 
David Levine has described similar conflicts between trade secret law 
and access in the context of voting machines and breathalyzer devices.  He 
warns that “public access to the internal workings of [voting] machines,” 
like those produced by Diebold Election Systems is difficult, “or in some 
cases impossible, to obtain.”256  Similarly, in a number of states, criminal 
defendants have challenged the validity of breathalyzer tests used to 
prosecute them, seeking the machines’ source code to determine their 
accuracy.257  Levine warns that in both contexts, “the public’s interest in 
transparency is marred by trade secrecy doctrine, providing a very powerful 
tool to prevent wide dissemination of basic information about governmental 
operations.”258 
And in the internet search engine context, Frank Pasquale has described 
the role of trade secrets “as undisclosed ‘rules of the game’ in competitions 
for prominence in search engine results.”259  Entities such as Google, 
Amazon, and eBay provide consumers with valuable filtering services.260  
However, these search engines often keep their sorting algorithms 
confidential, using trade secret law as the mechanism to do so.261  While 
search engines may have valid reasons for keeping their algorithms secret 
 
 254. See Paul M. Barrett, A Second Chemical Spilled in West Virginia, and the Company 
Said Nothing Until Now, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-23/a-second-toxic-chemical-spilled-in-west-
virginia-and-freedom-industries-said-nothing-until-now. 
 255. See Ken Ward Jr., Second Chemical Information “Very Limited,” CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 2014, at A1 (noting that Freedom delayed disclosing information for 
almost two weeks after the spill occurred, when West Virginia’s Department of 
Environmental Protection finally issued an order “demanding that Freedom Industries 
disclose . . . any and all information fully describing the composition of the materials spilled 
into the Elk River”). 
 256. Levine, supra note 220, at 419.  In November 2005, for example, Diebold refused to 
comply with a North Carolina law requiring electronic voting machine vendors “to place, 
among other items, their software and source code in escrow ‘with an independent escrow 
agent approved by the State Board of Elections,’” so the state could test voting systems. Id. 
at 419–20 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163–165.9A(a) (2005)).  Citing trade secret law, 
Diebold sued the North Carolina Board of Elections, seeking a preliminary injunction 
against enforcement of the statute. Id. at 420.  Ultimately, “Diebold chose to withdraw from 
competition for business within the state” and “chose to focus on states where trade secrecy 
law is completely impermeable to public law overrides.” Id. at 420–21. 
 257. Id. at 423–25. 
 258. Id. at 425. 
 259. Pasquale, supra note 21, at 403. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 395.  As Pasquale observes: 
[T]he core of Google’s business model is its search engine, and no one outside the 
company truly understands how that works.  The company prides itself on keeping 
its algorithms confidential, and trade secrecy law has helped it defeat or limit even 
governmental requests for more data on how it operates. 
Id. at 394–95. See generally James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007). 
1444 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
(e.g., to prevent tampering with results), many people are affected by their 
place in the “pecking order that search engines create.”262  And 
problematically, they have no ability to understand or contest search engine 
results because the algorithms are protected trade secrets.263 
2.   Means of Accessing Information:  FOIA Requests 
and Unauthorized Disclosures by Employees and Third Parties 
The expansive definitional breadth of trade secrets, coupled with the lack 
of meaningful ex post limits, affects both the public’s ability to access 
information that companies have disclosed to the government through 
FOIA requests, as well as the likelihood that information will be made 
public by employees and third parties. 
Government agencies, in keeping with their regulatory function, receive a 
great deal of information from businesses, some of which businesses 
consider to be trade secrets.  Under FOIA, anyone can request copies of 
documents from executive branch agencies.264  While FOIA applies only to 
the federal government, each state has a similar statute.265  Obviously, 
business competitors have an interest in obtaining valuable trade secrets, 
and FOIA provides a vehicle to do this.  Thus, FOIA contains certain 
exemptions against the disclosure of trade secrets.266  Agencies wield 
considerable discretion in deciding whether to disclose information 
requested under FOIA that the submitter claims is a trade secret.267 
A comprehensive analysis of the “intricate patchwork of agency rules and 
regulations that govern the treatment of trade-secret information”268 under 
FOIA is beyond the scope of this Article.  But insofar as agencies (and 
reviewing courts) rely on the UTSA and common law in making these 
 
 262. Pasquale, supra note 21, at 403. 
 263. Id. at 403–04; see also Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search 
Commission?  Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1149, 1151 (2008). 
 264. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-175, 121 Stat. 2524; see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance:  When Should 
Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 804–08 
(2011) (noting that the requester need not show “standing, legitimate interest, or any other 
threshold requirement to be entitled to the information”). 
 265. See generally Burt A. Braverman & Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State 
Open Records Laws, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 720 (1981); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, 
What Constitutes “Trade Secrets” Exempt from Disclosure Under State Freedom of 
Information Act, 27 A.L.R. 4th 773 (1984). 
 266. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)–(4).  Subsection 3 exempts from disclosure information that is 
“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.” Id. § 552(b)(3).  Subsection 4 exempts 
from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a 
person and privileged or confidential.” Id. § 552(b)(4).  Thus, subsection 4 is the more 
expansive of the two, encompassing not only trade secrets but also “commercial or financial 
information” that are “privileged or confidential.” See Rowe, supra note 264, at 805 (noting 
that these exemptions are “permissive, not mandatory”). 
 267. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Courts review agency determinations under the deferential 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard. Id. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281, 318 (1979); Reliance Electric Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 924 F.2d 
274, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 268. Rowe, supra note 264, at 798. 
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disclosure determinations, the absence of meaningful ex post limits in trade 
secret law adversely affects requesters’ ability to access information 
relevant to public health, safety, and welfare.269  And as commentators have 
observed, agencies are too deferential to a submitter’s own characterization 
of the information as a trade secret.270  For example, “if the FDA is 
uncertain about whether the material is in fact protected, the FDA will 
consult with the trade-secret owner to determine if the material should be 
disclosed.”271 
In addition, employees or third-party receivers seeking to disclose 
information relevant to public health, safety, and welfare may find 
themselves at odds with trade secret law.  For example, suppose a former 
tobacco industry executive who has signed a confidentiality agreement with 
his previous employer “reveal[s] in an Internet blog information about trade 
secret-protected studies conducted by his prior firm that showed harmful 
health impacts of smoking.”272  While some state and federal 
“whistleblower” statutes have been enacted to privilege certain employee 
disclosures that would otherwise be considered trade secret violations, they 
are limited in application.273  And in general, courts have been more 
hospitable to disclosures by third-party receivers of trade secrets, 
particularly established news organizations, than to disclosures by 
employees.274 
IV.   TOWARD A DOCTRINE OF TRADE SECRET FAIR USE 
Limiting doctrines play an integral role in intellectual property law.  
While trade secret law increasingly bears the moniker of intellectual 
property, it lacks sufficient limits to address cumulative innovation and 
First Amendment concerns.  As the previous sections illustrate, trade secret 
law’s relative indifference to the social benefits of unauthorized use stands 
in contrast to copyright and, to a lesser extent, patent law. 
 
 269. The Department of Justice provides a FOIA guide to help determine when 
information is a trade secret. United States Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of 
Information Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-guide-
freedom-information-act-0. 
 270. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 21, at 503–04; Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. 
Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information:  Reforming 
Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (1980). 
 271. Rowe, supra note 264, at 808 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 20.20 (2010)). 
 272. Samuelson, supra note 118, at 819. 
 273. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 274. Samuelson, supra note 118 at 820; see, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 
(1994) (denying injunction to meatpacking company that sued to prevent CBS’s telecast of 
videotape footage taken at the company’s factory that exposed unsanitary practices); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (denying Ford’s motion for 
preliminary injunction against internet blogger’s disclosure of trade secret–protected 
information related to Ford’s strategies for fuel economy and vehicle emissions); see also 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (imposing 
liability on two kinds of defendants:  direct misappropriators of secret information—e.g., 
employees and those who use improper means to obtain information—and third party 
receivers of such information who knew or should have known the information was 
wrongfully obtained—e.g., knowing or negligent receivers of trade secrets). 
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This part considers reforms to trade secret law that would strengthen and 
clarify consideration of a defendant’s unauthorized but socially beneficial 
use of another’s trade secret.  The creation of statutory safe harbors or 
categorical exemptions from trade secret subject matter may carry certain 
benefits in terms of predictability and consistency.  But such reforms 
require legislative action in the face of industry lobbying efforts, and a 
piecemeal approach to the problem risks under-inclusion and incoherence.  
Instead, I argue that trade secret law needs a more comprehensive and 
standardized doctrine of fair use.  This part sketches the contours of such a 
doctrine, which will provide courts with defined factors to weigh, in order 
to better balance exclusive rights and public welfare.  This part also 
addresses potential objections to this approach. 
A.   Enacting Statutory Safe Harbors 
One possible reform is for federal or state legislatures to enact clearly 
defined, nonexclusive fair use “safe harbors” for trade secret law.  Uses that 
fall within these categories would be considered per se fair use, rendering 
users free from liability.  A few scholars seem to support such specific 
carve-outs.  For example, Annemarie Bridy has argued that trade secret 
protection for medical device pricing data should be precluded.275  
Similarly, David Levine has suggested that trade secret protection should 
not be available for “private entities engaged in activities such as providing 
voting or breathalyzer machines to the government.”276 
The benefits of such an approach compared to a flexible fair use doctrine 
are greater certainty and predictability of application.  To be sure, one of the 
key criticisms of copyright fair use doctrine is courts’ inconsistent and 
unpredictable application of the doctrine.277  But statutory fair use harbors 
come with their own set of practical concerns.  For example, they require 
legislative enactment.  And any legislative action at the state or federal level 
restricting owners’ rights or reducing the breadth of trade secret subject 
matter seems unlikely, given that industry lobbying has resulted in a one-
way ratcheting up of intellectual property owners’ rights to exclude.278  By 
contrast, a multifactor test need not be enacted by legislatures in the first 
instance.  Notably, copyright fair use arose from the common law over a 
century before codification.279 
 
 275. Bridy, supra note 5, at 189. 
 276. Levine, supra note 220, at 435. 
 277. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 165. 
 278. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.  In fact, Congress is currently 
considering legislation to federalize trade secrecy, which would likely have the effect of 
strengthening the rights of trade secret owners.  These proposals include the Promoting 
American Trade Secrets Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong. (2012), and the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2667, 113th Cong. (2014).  For a discussion of these proposals and 
their potential enhancement of trade secret owners’ rights (like broadening the scope of trade 
secret misappropriation to cover extraterritorial conduct), see Seaman, supra note 28, at 25–
31, 59–63. 
 279. The judiciary introduced copyright’s fair use doctrine over 150 years before it was 
codified by the legislature in the Copyright Act. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1210 
(observing that “[h]istorically, courts in intellectual property cases have adjusted the law to 
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Another drawback of a piecemeal safe harbor approach is a lack of 
coherence—a criticism that has also been levied against statutory safe 
harbors in copyright law.280  Finally, statutory safe harbors risk under-
inclusiveness, because certain beneficial uses cannot be foreseen.  The 
flexibility of a multifactor fair use analysis can accommodate unanticipated 
but beneficial uses across a broad range of industries.281  On balance, a 
trade secret fair use defense seems preferable—though supplementation by 
specifically targeted fair use safe harbors (e.g., medical devices pricing 
data) might also make sense, provided there is legislative will to do so. 
B.   Trade Secret Fair Use 
As demonstrated in Parts II and III, trade secret law lacks a coherent 
framework for dealing with cases of substantial improvement or disclosure 
cases that trigger First Amendment interests.  In the sections that follow, I 
map out the contours of trade secret fair use. 
While this proposed trade secret fair use analysis resembles copyright fair 
use in certain respects, it diverges to address certain differences in trade 
secret subject matter—e.g., technical inventions comprise a larger part of 
trade secret subject matter.  Significantly, a doctrine of trade secret fair use 
should (more clearly than its copyright counterpart) bifurcate the questions 
of whether infringement liability should be excused and whether 
compensation is required.  In this respect, the suggested trade secret fair use 
inquiry borrows from the insights of patent remedies analysis post-eBay, as 
well as from the insights of scholars advocating a fair use–type defense in 
the patent context.282 
In practical terms, courts should rely on defined factors to guide a trade 
secret fair use analysis.  Relevant factors include:  (1) the purpose and 
character of the use (e.g., whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes); (2) the nature of the trade secret 
information (e.g., whether it is of a technical nature, like a manufacturing 
process, or a business nature, like pricing data); (3) the substantiality of the 
trade secret information used relative to the plaintiff’s end product/process 
and the defendant’s end product/process (e.g., the extent to which the 
defendant has “improved” upon the trade secret information); and (4) the 
effect of the use on the owner’s incentives and likelihood of market harm.  
The analysis under individual factors may overlap to a certain degree.  And, 
as in copyright, this list need not be exhaustive and no one factor need be 
 
address changing conditions”); see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure 
Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 
13–22 (1997). 
 280. See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 70, at 1835 (noting the “disconnected, granular 
exemptions scattered” throughout the Copyright Act). 
 281. For example, when copyright fair use was codified in 1976, the legislature likely did 
not foresee certain beneficial uses—e.g., use of copyrighted images in searchable digital 
databases, like Google Books. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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determinative.  Moreover, because trade secret fair use is an equitable and 
affirmative defense, the infringer bears the burden of proof. 
If the court decides that the infringement is fair under these factors, the 
next question is whether the infringer should compensate the trade secret 
owner.  As a general matter, if a defendant’s use is deemed a substantial 
improvement and thus fair under the factors above, the defendant should be 
required to compensate the trade secret owner through a reasonable royalty.  
On the other hand, if the defendant’s disclosure of a secret is for educational 
purposes related to public health, safety, or welfare, then this is likely to 
result in a royalty-free outcome—i.e., analogous to copyright’s “all-or-
nothing” fair use. 
I address each of these factors in greater depth below, though a 
comprehensive discussion of each factor is not possible in a single article.  
Rather, the goal of the sections that follow is to set forth, in broad brush 
strokes, the guiding principles of a trade secret fair use analysis. 
1.   Purpose of the Infringing Use 
Pursuant to this factor, courts would assess the purpose of the infringing 
use, including whether it is commercial or noncommercial.  Similar to 
copyright law, a noncommercial use would weigh in favor of fair use.  For 
example, under this factor, courts would look more favorably upon a 
defendant who discloses information for nonprofit, educational purposes 
(e.g., to educate the public about the hazards of a chemical composition) 
than a market competitor using the information to create a similar end 
product.283  A commercial use is more likely than a noncommercial use to 
depress the originator’s incentives without a concomitant increase in social 
welfare.  While commercial uses are less likely to be fair use than 
noncommercial ones, the fact that a use is commercial should not 
automatically lead to a rejection of fair use. 
2.   The Nature of the Trade Secret Information 
From the perspective of promoting incentives to create, businesses have 
adequate incentives to create certain kinds of information, like customer 
lists and pricing data.  Trade secret law plays less of a role in incentivizing 
the creation of this kind of “business” information than it does “technical” 
information, like manufacturing processes and chemical formulas.284  Also, 
the latter hew more closely to the historical origins of trade secret law.  
Early trade secret cases largely involved secret manufacturing processes, 
and attempts to expand protection to business information like customer 
lists were viewed with skepticism.285 
 
 283. This factor echoes a suggestion of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
with respect to unauthorized disclosures of trade secrets. See supra note 209 and 
accompanying text. 
 284. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 285. See Bridy, supra note 5, at 194–97 (noting that “in some of the early cases involving 
customer lists, claims of trade secret protection for information not readily classifiable as a 
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Interestingly, courts already make this distinction in the context of 
discovery disputes during patent litigation for claims involving trade 
secrets—i.e., affording greater protection to proprietary technical 
information than to ordinary business information.286  Thus, in assessing 
factor two, courts should look at whether the protected information is of a 
technical nature (e.g., patentable process or chemical formula) or if it is of a 
business nature (e.g., pricing data)—the latter weighing in favor of a 
finding of fair use. 
Similarly, the copyright fair use inquiry recognizes that some types of 
protected works are closer to the core of what copyright law is meant to 
protect.  That is, creative works, like a novel or a musical composition, are 
viewed as more deserving of protection than fact-based works, like a 
history textbook or almanac.287 
3.   The Substantiality of the Trade Secret Information Used 
Relative to the Plaintiff’s End Product/Process 
and the Defendant’s End Product/Process 
Under this factor, courts should primarily assess the extent to which the 
defendant has improved upon the trade secret.  Substantial improvement of 
trade secret information will weigh in favor of fair use.  The explicit 
consideration of improvement attempts to adjust the exclusion right in a 
way that encourages substantial follow-on improvements. 
As previously discussed, both the definition and calculation of 
improvement present unique challenges in the trade secret context.288  But 
where, for example, the defendant claims that protected information was 
used to create a more efficient or better functioning version of the original 
technology, courts can assess the substantiality of the improvement by 
considering evidence of its commercial success and measurable impact on 
an industry, if such evidence is available.289  Similarly, the defendant’s use 
of trade secret information as an intermediate step in producing a different 
 
method, formula or process and not the product of any ‘special ingenuity’ were regarded 
with skepticism by courts, which sought to distinguish trade secrets from ordinary, albeit 
private, business information”); see also, e.g., Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 270 S.W. 
834, 836–37 (Ky. App. 1925); In re Bolster, 110 P. 547, 548 (Wash. 1919) (“The term ‘trade 
secret’ as it is usually understood means a secret formula or process, not patented, known 
only to certain individuals who use it in compounding or manufacturing some article of trade 
having a commercial value.  It is rarely, if ever, used to denote the mere privacy with which 
an ordinary commercial business is carried on.”). 
 286. See, e.g., Tailored Lighting, Inc. v. Osram Sylvania Prods., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 146, 148 
(W.D.N.Y. 2006); Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., 224 F.R.D. 53, 57 (D. Conn. 
2004); Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstand Data Control, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. 
Del. 1988). 
 287. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994); Feist 
Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991). 
 288. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 289. Cf. Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 709–10 (suggesting that similar facts should guide 
remedies determinations in the patent context).  In patent law, the commercial success of an 
invention is also viewed as a “secondary consideration” that influences the 
“nonobviousness” inquiry. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
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end product than the plaintiff’s end product is more suggestive of 
improvement.  Moreover, a plaintiff’s non-use of the protected information 
(which the UTSA problematically permits),290 compared to the defendant’s 
productive use of the information is also more suggestive of improvement. 
Requiring improvement to be of a “substantial” or “significant” degree is 
an important limitation to address concerns of opportunism by competitors.  
Under this framework, a trade secret defendant cannot escape liability by 
making marginal or minor improvements.  Moreover, given the difficulty of 
identifying and valuing improvement in the intellectual property context, a 
significance requirement can help manage courts’ definitional anxiety in 
labeling a second-comer’s unauthorized use an improvement that merits 
departure from the traditional trade secret analysis.291  In close cases, or 
where the value of the defendant’s contribution is ambiguous, this factor 
will favor the trade secret owner and a finding of fair use is unlikely. 
4.   Effect of the Use on Owner’s Incentives/Likelihood of Market Harm 
Pursuant to this factor, courts can consider whether the infringer’s use (if 
it became widespread) would have an adverse economic impact on the trade 
secret owner and depress the owner’s innovation incentives.  To some 
extent, this factor overlaps with the previous factor, in that the defendant’s 
use of the plaintiff’s trade secret to create a different, noncompeting end 
product, or plaintiff’s non-use of the protected information, is less likely to 
result in market harm to the plaintiff.  However, if a work is deemed a 
substantial or significant improvement under factor three, then the market 
harm analysis should recede in importance.  Thus, “courts must be willing 
to permit a use in circumstances where it adds a great deal of value relative 
to what has been copied, even if the result is to harm the market for the 
original.”292 
And as with copyright’s market harm analysis, the primary focus is 
market usurpation by a directly competing product, not the harm that results 
from negative commentary or criticism.  So if a book critic writes a bad 
review of a novel that incorporates quoted sections of the book without 
permission, and this bad review results in fewer sales, that is not a form of 
market harm that weighs against a finding of copyright fair use.293  
Similarly, where trade secret protected information is disclosed for public 
health purposes and results in market harm to the owner, that market harm 
is not cognizable under this factor. 
Moreover, with respect to the trade secret owner’s innovation incentives, 
the nature of the trade secret information will once again play a part in the 
analysis, as businesses often have adequate incentives to create “business” 
 
 290. See supra note 34. 
 291. Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 682–83 (describing the similar purpose of the 
“significance” requirement in traditional property’s “improvement doctrines”). 
 292. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1078. 
 293. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–93 (1994) (explaining 
the distinction between “remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement”). 
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information even in the absence of trade secret protection.294  As for 
“technical” information that is more akin to patentable subject matter, 
courts can also consider “the nature of both R&D and product market 
competition in the particular industry.”295  If, for example, “the R&D 
investment is quite large in absolute dollars,” there may be a greater effect 
on innovation incentives because the owner “may require a certain lead 
time in the market to allow it to recoup both its investment and a reasonable 
return.”296 
5.   Appropriateness of a Reasonable Royalty 
One of the criticisms of copyright fair use (and affirmative defenses in 
intellectual property more generally) is the “all-or-nothing” nature of the 
inquiry.  If, for example, a use is deemed fair, users do not have to pay to 
use the work.  On the other hand, if the use is not subject to an affirmative 
defense, then “users face the . . . full arsenal of remedies.”297  Compulsory 
licenses stand between the two ends of the spectrum, allowing unauthorized 
uses for pay.  The patent remedies analysis post-eBay also helps mediate the 
two extremes. 
Courts can use the four-factor test described above to help with the 
compensation inquiry.  But as a general matter, should a defendant’s use be 
deemed a substantial improvement and thus “fair” under the factors above, 
the defendant would likely be required to compensate the trade secret owner 
through a reasonable royalty.  On the other hand, if the defendant’s 
disclosure of a secret was for educational purposes related to public health, 
safety, or welfare, then this is likely to result in a royalty-free outcome—
e.g., analogous to copyright’s “all-or-nothing” fair use. 
The benefit of this approach is that it recognizes and attempts to reconcile 
the somewhat discordant strains of fair use.  On the one hand, fair use is 
sometimes justified because of high transaction costs that frustrate private 
bargaining.  But copyright fair use also “excuses payment because the fair 
use is of a type, like criticism or responding to it, that policymakers believe 
should not be commodified” because it promotes First Amendment 
interests.298  This concern applies equally to the many of the public interest 
cases described in Part III—in such cases, a “free” fair use seems more 
justified. 
The difficulties of valuation (e.g., crafting a reasonable royalty) are an 
oft-invoked reason for preferring injunctive relief, rather than damages, to 
remedy intellectual property infringement.299  Valuation difficulties are, 
however, largely unavoidable in the context of intellectual property.  For 
 
 294. See supra notes 103, 284 and accompanying text. 
 295. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1208. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Fagundes, supra note 70, at 1840. 
 298. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1209 (noting that “educational and other non-profit uses 
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 299. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659–60 (1994). 
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example, they suffuse licensing negotiations, settlements, and damage 
awards for past infringement.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay 
underscores this point, by insisting that courts cannot avoid the difficulties 
of valuation by automatically resorting to injunctive relief in patent 
infringement cases.300 
C.   Addressing Objections to Trade Secret Fair Use 
Lack of predictability is one of the biggest criticisms of fair use in the 
copyright context.301  Parchomovsky and Goldman, for example, argue that 
the preference for ambiguous “standards” like fair use over clearer rules can 
“lead to overdeterrence, which, in turn, will cause potential defendants to 
overinvest in precautions.”302  The unpredictability inherent in a flexible, 
context-specific fair use defense, along with increased opportunism 
concerns, may indeed lead trade secret owners to invest in wasteful 
expenditures to protect secrecy (e.g., stronger walls and fences) that trade 
secret law was intended to alleviate.303  Moreover, increased concerns of 
opportunism may also have a deleterious effect on owners’ innovation 
incentives—particularly with respect to information or know-how that does 
not fall within patentable subject matter (e.g., negative know-how). 
While these are legitimate concerns, the introduction of a fair use defense 
might nonetheless have a positive channeling effect—i.e., encouraging 
innovators to protect patentable technical information with a patent rather 
than trade secret, thus giving the public the benefit of full disclosure.304  In 
recent years, certain legal developments have made trade secret protection 
“more attractive vis-à-vis patent protection.”305  These developments 
include the expansion of prior user rights in the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act306 (AIA), new limits on patentable subject matter,307 and the 
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1304–05 (2012). 
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elimination of the “general rule” of issuing injunctive relief upon a finding 
of patent infringement.308 
Moreover, while uncertainty is often a feature of legal “standards” like 
fair use as opposed to more rigid “rules,” requiring the consideration of pre-
fixed factors can help mitigate uncertainty.309  And the dangers of systemic 
uncertainty may lessen over time, once parties “become aware of the 
paradigmatic cases in which it will likely be successful.”310  The 
introduction of uncertainty may also help facilitate trade secret licensing.311 
CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property law seeks to optimize social welfare by guarding 
against both the under- and over-protection of information.  To this end, 
owners’ rights to exclude are limited when unauthorized uses carry certain 
social benefits.  Copyright law and (to a lesser extent) patent law 
incorporate ex post limiting doctrines that try to balance owners’ rights to 
exclude against competing concerns, such as promoting cumulative 
innovation and First Amendment interests.  Notably, copyright law’s fair 
use doctrine protects a variety of unauthorized but socially beneficial uses, 
like educational and “transformative” uses.  While patent law relies more on 
ex ante requirements for this balancing purpose, it too has ex post limiting 
doctrines—like the reverse doctrine of equivalents and an increasingly 
searching remedies analysis—that direct courts to consider the social 
benefits of a defendant’s unauthorized use. 
Like unauthorized users in patent and copyright, certain transgressors of 
trade secret law (e.g., substantial “improvers” of protected information and 
“disclosers” of information related to public health, safety and welfare) also 
serve socially beneficial ends.  This Article demonstrates, however, that 
trade secret law is largely indifferent to them.  This is particularly 
concerning, given trade secret law’s expansive subject matter breadth, ease 
of acquisition, and increasing attractiveness to companies.  While the 
theoretical justifications for trade secret law historically have been more 
varied and controversial than for patent or copyright, courts and scholars 
increasingly theorize trade secret law as a subset of intellectual property 
because it encourages information production.  Despite its characterization 
as “intellectual property,” however, trade secret law lacks adequate ex post 
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limiting doctrines designed to promote cumulative innovation and First 
Amendment interests. 
This Article argues that trade secret law should adopt a multifactor fair 
use doctrine to better accommodate these competing concerns.  This 
defense would require courts to weigh four defined factors in deciding 
whether to excuse a defendant’s otherwise infringing acts, or alternatively, 
deny injunctive relief in favor of a reasonable royalty.  These factors are 
designed to help courts identify situations where substantial improvements 
or public disclosure of matters relevant to public health, safety, and welfare 
are likely to be deterred.  Though named after its copyright counterpart, 
trade secret fair use will differ in some key respects.  Unlike copyright’s 
“all-or-nothing” fair use analysis, the trade secret fair use analysis will 
require courts to decide whether a reasonable royalty award is warranted 
(e.g., in cases of substantial improvement).  In this way, trade secret law can 
continue to protect owners’ incentives, while nonetheless ensuring safety 
valves for cumulative innovation and First Amendment interests that will 
help keep the law in sync with its intellectual property siblings. 
